Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem by Mediavilla, Anthony Scott
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
i
ANALYSIS
OF TH E
NOSE WHEEL STEERING
SUBSYSTEM
w
I
I
21 NOVEMBER 1986
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900001605 2020-03-20T01:01:42+00:00Z
IU
I
Ti,
"Ira
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY
HOUSTON DIVISION
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT
WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA86001-03
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ANALYSIS OF THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING SUBSYSTEM
n
21 NOVEMBER 1986
This Working Paper is Submitted to NASA under
Task Order No. VA86001, Contract NAS 9-17650
u
w
-_- !
PREPARED By /I
Engineer
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
APPROVED BY
NWS Lead
independent Orbiter
Assessment
Technical Manager
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
W.F. Huning
Deputy Program Manager
STSEOS
mm
m
II
Im
II
--r ....
z
I
J_
m _
j_
m -
J_
mm 7
m_
_ i_
mz
u
m
L
L
CONTENTS
i. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Pul_ose
Scope
Analysis Approach
NWS Ground Rules and Assumptions
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
4.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
Design and Function
NWS Modes
Steering Timeline
NWS Effectiveness
NWS Upgrades
NWS Component Description
Interfaces and Locations
Hierarchy
ANALYSIS RESULTS
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
THE RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES (RPA)
THE STEERING CONTROL BOX (SCB)
THE STEERING ACTUATOR ASSEMBL¥
THE NWS/EPD&C FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM
THE NWS/EPD&C ACTIVATION SYSTEM
THE NWS/DPS FLIGHT FORWARD MDMs
5.0 REFERENCES
APPENDIX A ACRONYMS
APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Page
1
4
4
4
4
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
9
9
18
19
20
20
21
21
21
22
A-i
B-I
Definitions B-2
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions B-4
NWS-System Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions B-6
APPENDIX C DETAILED ANALYSIS
APPENDIX D POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
C-I
D-I
b
m
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Table
Table
List of Figures
1 - NWS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
2 - NWS OVERVIEW
3 - NWS STEERING CONTROL BOX
4 - NWS RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
5 - NWS STEERING ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
6 - NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM
7 - NWS ACTIVATION SYSTEM
8 - NWS FLIGHT FORWARD MULTIPLEX_/DEMULTIPLEXERS
9 - NWS FUNCTIONAL INTERFACES AND LOCATIONS
List of Tables
I - SUMMARY OF IOA FAILURE MODES AND
CRITICALITIES
II - SUMMARY OF IOA POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
Page
2
i0
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
Page
18
19
I
I
i
I
m
m
u
l
I
m
I
a -"
w
=_-
ii
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering Subsystem
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a _6p- o_n a--_lysis of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering
(NWS) hardware.
The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the
Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout.
the following components:
Steering Control Box (SCB)
The system consists of
O
o Rudder Pedal Assemblies (RPA)
o Steering Actuator Assembly
o Failure Annunciator System
o Activation System
o Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDM)
u
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The IOA analysis process utilized available NWS hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the seven major subdivisions of the NWS. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
+ +
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/i I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Number : I 6 I 36 - 15 - 21 78
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
potential critical items is presented as follows:
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) Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F) J
] Criticality: J i/I I 2/IRJ 2/2 J 3/IRJ 3/2RJ TOTAL J
I I I I I I I i
J Number : J 6 J 36 J - J - J - J 42 J
The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to
differentia ! braking for directional control of the Orbiter
during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the
NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy
built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has
forced the NSTS_toupgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional
control during rollout. As a result, a large pecentage of the
NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).
This current state of conditions will continue to exist until the
planned NWS system redesign (Phase III upgrade) is implemented.
W
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2. i Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office
has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/C!'L for the
Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical
accuracy.
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2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsyst_ functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific gTound rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare 10A analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 NWS Grmu_ Rnles and Assumptions
The NWS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to corTect ommissions and clarify ambiguities.
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3 • 0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The NWS hardware provides the primary directional control for the
Orbiter during landing rollout. Deflection of the rudder pedals
t_ansmits electrical steering signals to the NWS Control Box.
These electrical signals meter hydraulic power through the NWS
Actuator which physically displaces the actuator piston. The
piston, which is mechanically linked to the nose wheel collar,
can rotate the nose wheel through +/- i0 degrees for directional
control during rollout.
3.2 NWS Modes
The three modes of NWS operation are: i) General Purpose
Computer (GPC), 2) Direct (Manual), and 3) Free Castor. The GPC
mode of NWS is now the primary mode of directional control during
landing rollout. The GPC processes the steering signals before
sending them to the SCB. The GPC mode also has a triple channel
wraparound position feedback system with compare logic in the
software. This added redundancy was a key factor in elevating
NWS to its present status. The Direct mode of NWS uses its own
command transducer (xducer) and the steering signals bypass the
computer and go directly to the SCB. In the free castor mode of
NWS, the NW rotates freely and steering is accomplished by
differential braking and use of the rudder. During free castor,
the hydraulic system has an internal damping capability which
prevents the NW from shimmy oscillations.
3.3 Steering Timeline
The steering timeline is important to the analysis because some
failure modes have different effects and criticalities depending
on when the failure occurs. The GPC mode of NWS is selected
during the final approach phase of landing. Between main gear
touchdown (MGTD) and nose gear touchdown (NGTD), all directional
control is performed by the rudder. SLmula_ions at the NASA Ames
moving base simulator have shown that when the crew applied the
brakes whale the nose Wheel was in the air, it led tO an
uncontrollable negative pitching moment that resulted in large
pitch rates at NGTD that would structurally damage the NW strut.
Following NGTD, NWS is active and operates in tandem with the
rudder. The rudder effectiveness decreases as the Orbiter
decelerates, becoming essentially ineffective at about 75 knots
airspeed. Braking may begin at about iS0 knots ground speed.
Studies and flight data have shown that initiating braking at
higher speeds will result An brake/tAre failures.
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3.4 _S Effe_:iv_ess
Steering with the NW takes advantage of an effective moment arm
about five times as long as that available when using
differential braking. The turning capability using only
differential braking is not adequate to maintain directional
con_Tol of the Orbiter for a landing scenario with blown tires.
This inadequacy has contributed to _he recent upgrades to the NWS
requirements.
3.5 NWS Upgrades
A three phase upgrade to NWS was initiated with the goal of
m_ing t_he system fail operational/fail safe. Phase I upgrade
consisted of rewiring the GPC and Direct positions on the NWS
switch, disconnecting the GPC contact, and adding a 2.5 inch
extension to the switch toggle. The rewiring inhibited the GPC
mode and the extension made the task of turning on Direct, which
must be done after NGTD, a little easier. The Phase II upgrade
was implemented on flights STS-61A, STS-61C, and STS-51L. It
primarily consisted of reconnecting the GPC switch contact and
adding the wraparound FB system that includes Redundancy
Management (RM) for operational control and failure detection
logic. Parabolic signal shaping was also added to the command
xducer steering signal (Direct :ode of NWS). This is the current
design and was used in the analysis. The Phase III upgrade is in
the early design stage. Until the NWS redesign has eliminated all
the single point failure modes, the system is at best fail safe.
3.6 NWS Component Description
The following sections highlight the major components of NWS:
(Reference Figure 2)
i. The SCB has a single electricai power source, Main Bus A.
At NGTD the GPC issues enable signals that trigger the SCB to
route this power to the pilot valve solenoids in the steering
actuator assembly. The steering signal current is monitored
in the SOB before being transmitted to the steering actuator
system. The SOB contains five separate failure detection
circuits that monitor potential NWS failure modes. Any one
fail uredetec_ion°will automatically dowrLmode NWS to the free
castor mode and annunciate We fail light.
(Reference Figure 3).
2. The RPA consist of the commander's and pilot's rudder pedals
and linkages, two rudder pedal transducer assemblies (RPTA),
one NWS command transducer and four brake pedal position
transducers. The commander's and pilot's rudder pedals are
mechanically linked to each other and to the transducers.
Steering signals are proportional to the translational
deflection of the rudder pedals. Braking signals are
proportional to the rotational (toe) deflection of the rudder
pedals. Rudder commands are independent of NWS (Reference
Figure 4).
7
3, The NWSActuator Assembly converts electrical steering
signals into a displacement of the actuator arm which is
mechanically linked to the NW. Hydraulic system No.l
provides 3000 psi fluid to the NWS actuator. The fluid is
filtered before it reaches the shutoff valve. Pilot valve
No.l opens or closes the shutoff valve. Pilot valve No.2
opens or closes the Bypass/Control valves. Both pilot
valves must be open to energize the system; if either one
closes, the system downmodes to the free castor mode. Once
the hydraulic pressure in the actuator reaches 1350 psi, a
pressure sensitive switch closes which inhibits the
hardwired electrical path to the NWS fail light, if the
pressure falls below i000 psi, the pressure switch will
close and annunciate the fail light,
After the system is energized, the electro-hydraulic (EH)
serve valve meters high pressure flow proportional to the
steering signal transmitted by the SCB. The high pressure
drives the actuator piston/arm which is attached to a collar
on the nose gear strut which rotates the torque link and the
NW. A feedback xducer provides "steering velocity" data to
the SCB which is used in one of the failure detection
circuits. In the GPC mode, the steering position transducer
(SPT) and steering position amplifier (SPA) provide NW
position data which is used by the GPC failure detection
logic in the NW Subsystem Operating Program (SOP).
System protection against high pressure is provided by two
overload check valves and a return line check valve. Low
system pressure required for shimmy damping during free
castor is provided by the accumulator through the anti-
cavitation check valves (Reference Figure 5).
4. The Failure Annunciator System illuminates a NWS fail light
which warns the crew that a detectable failure has occurred
or that the NWS system may be unreliable. A subsystem
specific groundrule was written stating that the crew will
respond the the annunciated fail light by manually dowr_oding
NWS to free castor. Control Bus ABI provides power to a Type
IIi hybrid circuit driver which will allow annunciator
circuit lamp power to illuminate the NWS fail light. The
fail signal may originate in either the hardwired path from
the pressure switch or the MDM FF4 pat_f_om theNW Position
SOP. In the GPC mode the hardwired path is inhibited until
NGTD (Reference Figure 6).
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5. The Activation System was included to maintain a more
complete NWS analysis. The single power source for NWS ks
Main Bus _ The NWS toggle switch must be in the GPC or
Direct position for power to enter the system. A circuit
breaker provides protection against high voltage/current
spikes. The ROLL/YAW CSS/AUTO PBIs configure a flight
control channel that determines whether the steering signals
originate at the z_Idder pedals or in autoland guidance. The
activation system also has a current limit resistor in line
with the fail light power source CNTL ABI. There are three
isolation resistors providing circuit protection to MDM lines
that monitor the power lines (Reference Figure 7).
6. The Data Processing System (DPS) Flight Critical Forward
MDMs were included in this analysis because of the strong
dependence NWS has on the health of this interfacing
subsystem. Many of the NWS commands and signals are
transmitted via the flight critical MDMs. The MDMs act as
data aquisition, distribution and signal conditioning units.
This analysis will only consider single data path failures
(Reference Figure 8).
Above Items 4 and 5 interface with the Electrical Power and
Distribution Control (EPD&C) system. Item 6 interfaces with the
Orbiter DPS system. This document contains only a partial
analysis of these interfacing components. The analysis examines
only the NWS related effects of these component failure modes.
3.7 Interfaces and Locations
All of the major NWS components are located in one of three
locations on the Orbiter. The Activation System, the Failure
Annunciation System, and the Rudder Pedal Assemblies are located
on the Flight Deck. The NWS Control Box and Actuator Assembly
are both attached-.......... to the nose gear strut. _ The GPCs and the
Flight Forward MDMS _ are all located in Avionics Bays I, 2, and 3.
(Reference Figure 9).
3.8 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the NWS hardware. Figures
3 through 8 comprise the detailed System representations.
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Figure 2 - NWS OVERV_
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Figure 3 - NWS STEERING CONTROL BOX
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Figure 6 - NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
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Figure 8 - NWS FLIGHT FORWARD MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXERS
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Figure 9 - N'WS FUNCTIONAL INTERFACES AND LOCATIONS
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the six major subdivisions
of the NWS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions and
the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
i
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TABLE I
Criticality:
Rudder Pedal
Assemblies
NWS Control
Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C
Failure
Annunciation
SyStem
NWS/EPD&C
Activation
System
NWS/DPS Flight
Forward MDMs
m mmmmmmwm|mmmmmm|m|mmmmmmmmw+m_ _
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
i/I
1
4
1
2/IR
19
2
2
4
2/2 3/IR
2
4
I
1
3/2R 3/3
I0
TOTAL
8
6
37
5
i0
12
+wwmw|m|mwmmwm|mwwm(
I TOTAL I 6 I 36 I - I 12 ) - I 24 l 78 (
+mmm_mwmm_mo_mmmmmmmmmmmmm_mmmmn_mmmmmmmmmmmmmwm_mmnmmmmmmmmmm+
Of the 78 failure modes analyzed, 42 failures were determined to
be Potential Critical Items (PCI). A summary of the PCIs is
presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross reference
between each PCI and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
m
i
u
m
m
m
m
m
Q
m
mm
18
m
inmm
u
_=
z
m
m
. m m m i im e m m mm mmmimm_mmmmmimii
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
i_ ii i Joel
Criticality: 1/I 2/IR 2/2 3/1R 3/2R TOTAL
Rudder Pedal
Assemblies
NWS Control
Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C
Failure
Annunciation
System
1
4
NWS/EPD&C
Activation I
System i 1
I
NWS/DPS Flightl
Forward MDMs I -
I
5
4
19
m 6
23
3
4
IillllenOIIIqllIllllnll_O|_lllilmillglllllllIllIlIli+
I TOTAL i 6 I 36 l - i - i - I 42 l
t_
4.1 THE RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES (RPA)
The analysis of the RPA examined the failure modes for the
-_ rudder pedals, the RPTAs, and the command transducer. The
rudder pedals are a linkage system whose transducer measured
deflections control NWS, the rudder, and the brakes. The
Orbiter relies solely on the rudder for directional control
between MGTD and NGTD. If the rudder pedals jammed during
this phase of landing, it could result in the loss of the
Orbiter. For this reason, a criticality of 1/1 was assigned
to this failure mode. The RPTA and command transducer
signal outputs were failed in two modes: no output and
erroneous output. The failure of these transducer signals
results in the loss of NWS and/or rudder control. The
highest criticality assigned to the transducer failures was
2/IR. Out of a total of eight failure modes examined for
the RPA, six PCIs have been identified in Appendix D.
w
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4.2 THE STEERINGCONTROLBOX (SCB)
Schematics of the SCB 'as-built' are considered proprietary
by the customer and were not available for this study. The
SCB analysis considered the failure of the three primary
functions of the control box: NWS command output, NWS pilot
valve actuation, and NWS failure detection.
Of the six failure modes examined, four were assigned
criticalities of 2/IR. These failure modes resulted in the
automatic downmoding of NWS to free castor leaving only
differential braking to be relied upon for directional
control. These four PCIs have been identified in Appendix D.
4.3 THE STEERING ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
The Steering Actuator Assembly has by far the largest number
of components in the NWS system. Electronic hardware and
various types of hydraulic hardware were included in the
actuator analysis.
The NWS capability is lost should the actuator piston that
turns the nose wheel Jam. If the jam occurs when the nose
wheel is turned through some large angle, differential
braking may not provide enough turning force to overcome the
effects of the nose wheel deflection. This possible loss of
vehicle led to a criticality assignment of i/i for this
failure mode.
The GPC and Direct modes of NWS both use the actuator in
order to control the nose wheel. One of various valve
subcomponents of the actuator failing closed usually results
in the loss of the NWS capability leaving only differential
braking to be relied upon for directional control. As a
result, there are twenty criticalities of 2/1R for the
actuator.
A broken actuator piston linkage or a rupture in either the
actuator housing or hydraulic lines can cause the loss of
all NWS and shimmy damping capabilities and result in the
loss of the Orbiter. These failure modes were assigned
criticalities of i/1. Those failures that result in the
total loss of shimmy damping capability(Accumulator) but do
not affect NWS were assigned criticalities of 2/1R based on
the subsystem specific groundrule No. 8 (See Appendix B).
Components whose failure modes result in the loss of
only the GPC mode of NWS (SPA, SPT) were assigned
criticalities of 3/IR.
Out of a totai of thirty-seven failure modes examined for
the actuator assembly, twenty-three PCls have been
identified in Appendix D.
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4.4 THE NWS/EPD&C F_LURE ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
The NWS/EPD&C Failure Annunciation Subsystem is comprised of
a fail light, a control assembly, and a hybrid driver. The
two failure modes that resulted in the annunciation of the
fail light were assigned a criticality of 2/IR based on the
subsystem specific ground rule No. 7 (See Appendix B). Out
of the five failure modes examined in this subsystem, two
PCIs have been identified in Appendix D.
4, s  S/ aC
The NWS/EPD&C Activation Subsystem consists of the NWS
toggle switch, the NWS circuit breaker, the CSS/AUTO PBIs,
and resistors.
Jamming a CSS/AUTO PBI to the AUTO contact reconfigures
Flight Control (DAP) and causes the loss of all manual rudder
control for the vehicle. The Orbiter relies solely on the
rudder for directional control between MGTD and NGTD. When
landing in the AUTO mode, Autoland Guidance requires a
Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS) for the
generation of effective rudder commands. Because a MSBLS is
not available at all runways (Flight Rules only require a
MSBLS for night landings), failure to AUTO can result in the
possible loss of the Orbiter. The failure can be corrected
by holding the CSS PBI depressed; however, this corrective
action is not defined by nominal crew procedures. Because
off-nominal crew procedures are not considered in assigning
criticalities, a criticality of 1/I was assigned to this
failure mode.
Failing the toggle switch off or the circuit breaker open
removes power from the NWS system leaving only differential
braking to be relied upon for directional control. These
failures were assigned criticalities of 2/IR. Out of the
ten failure mgdes examined for this subsystem, three PCls
have been idehtified in Appendix D.
4.6 THE NWS/DPS FLIGHT FORWARD MDMs
MDMs FFI, FF2, FF3, and FF4 were examined in this analysis
because their function is essential to the operation of the
NWS system. The lowest criticality assigned to an MDM
failure in this analysis was 3/IR. Four failure modes that
result in the loss of both active modes of NWS have
criticalities of 2/IR. Out of the twelve failure modes
examined for the MDMs, four PCIs have been identified in
Appendix D.
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16. STS 83-0015A, Space Shuttle Operational Level C FSSR GN&C
Part E Subsystem Operating Programs Flight Control Sensor/
Controller, 6-30-85.
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ACRONYMS
AOA
ATO
AUTO
BFS
BITE
CENL
CIL
CMD
CNTL
CRIT
CSS
DDU
DPS
EH
ERR
ENA
- Abort Once Around
- Abort To Orbit
- Autoland Guidance Computer Configuration
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Channel
- Critical Items List
- Command, Commander
- Control
- Criticality
- Control Stick Steering
- Display Driver Unit
- Data Processing System
- Electro-Hydraulic
- Error
- Enable
EPD&C - Electrical Power Distribution and Control
ET - External Tank
F - Functional
FB - Feedback
FF - Flight Forward
FM - Failure Mode
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
GNC - Guidance Navigation and Control
GPC - General Purpose Computer
HDW - Hardware
HW - Hardware
HYD - Hydraulic
IOA - Independent Orbiter Assessment
LRU - Line Replaceable Unit
MAN - Manual (Direct Mode of NWS)
MDAC - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDM - Mul tip i exer/Demul t ipl exer
MGTD - Main Gear Touchdown
MM - Major Mode
MSBLS - Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
NA - Not Applicable
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NGTD - Nose Gear Touchdown
NSTS - National Space Transportation System
NW - Nose Wheel
NWS - Nose Wheel Steering
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
PBI
PCI
PLT
POS
RI
RM
RPA
RPTA
- Push Button Indicator
- Potential Critical Item
- Pilot
- Position
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Rudder Pedal Assembly
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
A-I
w
RTLS
SCB
SM
SOP
SPA
SPT
SRB
STS
SV
TAL
TD
WONG
WOW
- Return To Launch Site
- Steering Control Box
- Systems Management
- Subsystem Operating ProqTam
- Steering Position Amplifier
- Steering Position Transducer
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Transportation System
- Servo Valve
- Transoceanic Abor_ Landing
- Touch Down
- Weight on Nose Gear
- Weight on Wheels (main gear)
XDUCER- Transducer
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
I
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, l0 October 1986, were used with the r'o-[lowing
_plifications-'and addit_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
r_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOr_an- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
sition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MOD___EE_ - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0PS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(P---ASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or ev_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m-_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS :
PRELAUN_ _PKASE ' 5egi_ns-a£ launch -count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS i (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFiNITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
PreDaration of FMEA/CIL, 10 O-_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp-_ifications a-nd addition_.
I •
,
•
4.
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on'b0ard parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specificatlons/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their Performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur i_ the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
_ to NSTS 22206 ground rule-redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
m
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NWS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
lo
.
o
4o
The GPC (CSS) mode of NWS will be considered the
primary mode of directional control for the Orbiter
Vehicle following NGTDduring landing roliout.
RATIONALE: This is the flight rule since the Phase II
upgrade of NWS which has flown on 61-A, 61-C and 51-L.
The GPC (CSS) mode of NWS will be active (HOT) for all
landing sites and all landings: EOM and INTACT ABORTS.
RATIONALE: This is the flight rule since the Phase II
upgrade of NWS which has flown on 61-A, 61-C and 51-L.
Thenight Ruloswillrestri lan  ngoondltions
(weather, landing surface, and crosswinds) such that the
brake energy and rolloutmargins will fall within their
assigned limits when differential braking is used as
the primary mode of directional control following NGTD
during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: The NWS system is presently fail safe at
best with several single point failure points.
Differential braking must be a capable backup system to
NWS for directional control of the vehicle during
landing rollout until the Phase III upgrade of NWS is
completed.
Differential braking will be considered an unlike,
redundant backup system to NWS for directional control
of the Orbiter Vehicle during landing rollout following
NGTD.
RATIONALE: Differential braking applies differential
forces to the main gear tires in order to steer the
Orbiter but NWS uses an actuator system to turn the
nose wheel and steer the vehicle. Current flight rules
restrict landings to those conditions that allow a safe
rollout using differential braking for directional
control.
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The DIRECT (MANUAL) mode of NWS will be considered a
like, redundant backup system to the GPC (CSS) mode of
NWS for directional control of the Orbiter Vehicle
following NGTD during landing rollout.
RATIONALE- Both systems use MAIN BUS A power, the
rudder pedals, the NWS Control Box, the NWS Actuator,
and the nose wheel for directional control of the
Orbiter Vehicle.
The GPC (AUTO) mode of NWS will not be considered a
redundant system to the GPC (CSS) mode of NWS for
directional control of the Orbiter Vehicle during
Ianding rol i out.
RATIONALE: The GPC (AUTO) mode of NWS requires an
active Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS)
which is not available at all runways/landing sites.
The crew does not train using this control mode.
The crew will respond to the annunciation of the NWS
fail light by manually moving the NWS toggle switch to
the OFF position.
RATIONALE: MOD recommended crew procedures dictate
that the NWS switch be toggled to OFF when the NWS fail
light annunciates; however, the DIRECT mode of NWS may
then be selected if conditions warrant the risk.
For purposes of determining the functional criticality
of an item, the total loss of the NWS Actuator Assembly
shimmy damping capability shall result in the possible
loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Although the co-rotating nose wheels have a
stabilizing effect; sufficient test data is not
available to determine that the total loss of the nose
wheel shimmy damping capability is not life
_hreatening.
For purposes of passing Redundancy Screen B, the term
•Readily Detectable" shall be satisfied by the pilot's
ability to see the lack of Orbiter response to NWS
inputs during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: One of the pilot's primary tasks during
landing rollout has been to keep the Orbiter Vehicle on
the runway centerline. A loss of NWS response during
rollout is almost immediately recognizable by the pilot
following a rudder pedal input. Corrective action in
the form of differential braking is immediately
available.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation 9f_HEA
an__ddCIL, i00ctobe--_986. Fi_ e_t_are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOAANALYSIS WORESHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
i - Loss of life orvehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or un!ike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (iike or unlike) ali of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
i
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: i01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/1
I_: _DALS, RUDDER
FAI_ MODE: JAMMED (NO TRANSLATIONAL MOVEMENT)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
])
4)
s)
6)
_)
s)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
RUDDER PEDALS (2 SETS-MECHANICALLY LINKED)
• CRITICALITIES _
n.x_m_P_E _.llmllc _ m_/nmc
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDINGISAFING: II i
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AREA 30 (FLIGHT DECK]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (LOOSE DEBRIS), PC PART FAILURE
(BENT/BROKEN RODS) .......................
THE RUDDER PEDALS PROVIDE A MECHANICAL LINKAGE TO THE RPTAs, THE
COMMAND TRANSDUCER, AND THE BRAE_ TRK_SDUCZRS. THE RPTAs OUTPUT
CONTROL __ _ _UD__ I_W_,"_::_...... T _
BErO_ NGTD (C_UT iii): FAILING THE RUDDER PEDALS JAMMED WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ONLY DIRECTIONAL CONTROL USED BETWEEN
MAIN GEAR TOUCHDOWNAND NOSE G_a TOUCHDOWN._ LOSS OF
CREWlV_'ZCLE.
AFTER NGTD (CRIT 2/IR): THIS FAILO'R_ WILL NOT AUTOMATI_Y
DOWNMODE NWS. _ _ _ST MANUALLY DOWNMODE NWS BY TOGGLING THE
_S SWITCH TO OFF. DIF_IAL BRAKING IS THE ONLY MODE
AVAILABLE TO STEER THE VEHICLE AFTER NGTD.
REFrRENCSS :
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INDEP_D_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/LR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
PEDALS, RUDDER
LOSS OF LINKAGE
AS MEDL_VZU_ SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
e)
S)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
RUDDER PEDALS (2 SETS-MECHANICALLY LINKED)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE -_EDW/FUNC .... ABORT EDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFXNG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AREA 30 (FLIGHT DECK9
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RUDDER PEDALS PROVIDE A MECHANICAL LINKAGE TO THE RPTAs AND
THE COMMAND _SDUCER FOR_S _ _ _ B__RA_ TRANSDUC_ FOR
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. LOSS OF ONE RPTA LINKAGE HAS NO EFFECT-
THERE IS A SECOND RPTA. LOSS OF A SINGLE BRAKE TRANSDUCER LINKAGE
DOES NOT INHIBIT DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING BECAUSE THERE ARE FOUR
BRAKE_ TRANSDUCXRS; THE PILOT CAN ASSUME THE BRAKING TASK.
THE LOSS OF THE COMMAND _SDUCER LINKAGE WILL _P THE BROKEN
LINKAGE _DETECT-OR_ _ Nws _C0NT_0L BOX. _AUTOMATX_Y DO.ODE
NWS TO FRE_ _TOR AND _C!ATE _ NWS FAI_':_LIG_. ..........
THE DI_CT MODE OF NWS W_A/__O FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHIC_ ZS AV_L_BL_ AT __ S_S. Di_;_NTIAL B_G
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
_YSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID-" 103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_GHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/II
2/IR
_: TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS 16EDIAVILLA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCh'Y:
l)
:)
3)
4)
S)
(;)
";)
8)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
COMMAND TRANSDUCER
SUBSYS _: A HOCHSTEIN
.... CI_ITICALITIES
TL_GHT PHASE HDW/r_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: INA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEOII_IT: - /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAF_NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION: 30VSIA21; FLIGHT DECI_
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOcK, LOSS OF MEdiCAL LINKAGE
(SEPARATED COIL), ELECTRICAL OPEN
THE COMMAND TRANSDUCER SENDS THE STEERING SIGNALS TO THE NWS
CONTROL BOX WHEN NWS IS IN THE DIRECT (BACKUP) MODE. IF THE
COM_ Tjt_ISDUCZR FAILS, THE DIRECT MODE _-__-BE= _:
AVAILABLE. IF TEE FAILURE IS A Ti_ANSDUCER OPEN/SHORT oR BROKEN
LINKAGE DETECTRD BY THE NWS CONTROL BOX, NWS WILL AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODE T_O _ CASTOR AND THE NWS FAIL LIGHT WILL ANNUNCIATE.
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DOWNMODING OF BOTH THE GPC AND DI'I_CT MODES OF NWS._:_, _ _=
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAI_BLE AT EYFECTIVE_SP_EDS.
DIFPERENTIAL_NG MUSTBEUSED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WEENTHE
RUDDER BECOMES INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
II
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/LR
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
EREAEDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
COMMAND TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFI'NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 30VSIA21; FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0014
CAUSES:
SHORT
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, DEFORMED COIL, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COM__S_DU_C_R_S_S _ S_TEERING SIGNALS TO THE NWS
CONTROL BOX WHEN NWS IS IN THE DIRECT (BACI_UP) MODE. IF THE
_TRANSDU_ FAILS, _ OI"P_EL_T"MODE WILL NO LONGER BE
AVAILABLE. IF THE FAILURE IS A TRANSDUCER OPEN/SHORT OR BROKEN
LINKAGE DETECTED BY THE NWS CONTROL BOX, NWS WILL AUTOMATICALLY
_ODE TO=_ CASTOR _D_-N_W-S FAIL LIGHT W_LL ANNUNCIATE,
_SE Two TYPES OF_COM_ _SDU_ PAI_S W_LL _SULT iN THE
DOWNMODING OF BOTH THE GPC AND DIRECT MODES OF NWS.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VZHI_ XS AVAI_ AT _EFFEC_ SPEEDS.
RUDDER BECOMES INEFFECTIVE.
REFEHENCKS:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE : 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: i05
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
FAILURE MODE: SINGLE CHANNEL NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (RPTA) C2)
FLIGHT P_As E HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
CRITIC_TIES
ABORT HDW/n_C
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/ IR
ATO: /NA
_D_DANCY _SC_S: A[i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73AI4 (COMMANDER) , AI5 (PILOT) ; FLIGHT DECK
MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE
(SEPARATED COIL), ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RPTAs SEND SIGNALS TO THE RPTA SOP THAT ARE USED FOR STEERING
WHEN NWS IS OPERATING IN THE_ GPC (CSS) M_DE; THERE ARE
TWO RPTAs MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE RUDDER PEDALS AND EACH HAS
THREE TRANSDUCER CHANNELS ...........
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE Loss OF RUDDER (css)
CONTROL W_I_IS _ITI_ TO DI;LECTIONAL CObOL--DURING MAIN GEAR
ROLLOUT BEFORE NGTD. THE LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL WOULD RESULT
IN THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHI_=,_I_I il/=
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
THE AUTO MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE IF A MSBLS IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: GN&C 301 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
=
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 106 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
FAILURE MODE: SINGLE CHANNEL ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (RPTA) (2)
CRITiCALITIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC HDw/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 30V73AI4 (COMMANDER), AI5 (PILOT) ; FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, DEFORMED COIL, ELECTRICAL
SHORT .......
TH_ RPTAs SEND SIGNALS TO THE RPTA SOP THAT ARE USED FOR STEERING
WHEN NWS-iS_ OPERATIq_G IN _NOMINAL GPC (CSS) MODE, THERE
TWO RPTAs MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE RUDDER PEDALS AND EACH HAS
THREE TRANSDUCER CHANNELS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF RUDDER (CSS)
CONTROL WHICH IS CRITICAL TO DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING MAIN GEAR
ROLLOUT BEFORE NGTD. THE LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL WOULD RESULT
:IN THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
THE DIRECT MODE O? _S IS STILL AVAILABI_. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
THE AUTO MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE IFA MSBLS IS AVAILABLE.
RE;ERENCES: GN&C 302 (CRIT 3/IR)
C-7
INDEP_E_ O_I_ _SESSME_
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DATE: ii/17/86
SUBSYS_M: MS
MDAC ID: 107
_G_ST _ITI_ITY
F_G_:
MORT:
HDW/ UNC
2/LR
2/IR
I_:
F_L_ MODE:
_S_, R_D_ PED_ _SEMBLY (_A)
_SS OF _A 0_
_¥ST: _ _D_VI_ _SYS _: A HO_TEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
R_D_ PED_ _BLI_S
RUDD_ PED_ _SDUCER _SEMBLY (2)
_TI_TIES
_G_ P_E _W/_C _ORT HDW/_C
__: /NA RT_: 2/
T.T_OFF: /NA T_: 2/
ONO_IT: /NA AOA: 2/
DEO_IT: /NA ATO: /NA
__G/S_G: 2/_
_DUND_CY S_EENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
_TION: 30V73_14 (COM_DER) , AI5 (PI_T) ; F_G_ DECK
MC621-0043-3440
_USES: _SS OF _GE
EF_S/_TION_/i
_A S_DS MS _ R_D_ SIGN_ TO _ GPC. T_ _ _O
_ __I_Y _D TO _ R_D_ PED_.
BEFO_ NG_ (_T 2/_): FAIL_ OF A SECO_ _A _SULTS IN
_SS OF _DD_ (CSS) COBOL _I_ IS _ITI_ TO DI_CTIONAL
COBOL D_G _IN G_ RO_ BEFO_ NGTD. T_ _SS OF
D_ION_ COBOL WO_ _SULT IN _ POSSIBT_ _SS OF
CIt.EW/VEItICL_:___ ....._ .................. _.-: _____....... _ .............
_GTD (_T 31_): F_L_ OF A SECO_ _A WOU_ _S_T IN
_E LOSS OF THE c-PC (CSS) MODE 0F _S.I i__i
DI_ MODE CF _S IS STI_ AVerTs-. R_D_ COBOL OF
V_C_ IS NOT AV_7_. _ _ING IS A MODE OF
S__G _T IS STI_ AVAI_T_.
THE AUTO MODE OF GPC NWS iS STILL AVAI_BLE IF A MSBLS IS
AVAI_T _ i
_F_NCES: GN&C 304 (CRIT 2/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DA_: 11/i7/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I08 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/LR
SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
_)
NWS
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES
RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/NA
LANDING/SAF_NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 30V731AI4(COMMANDER), AIS(PILOT) ; FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SHORT COIL TO COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE z
THE RPTA SENDS NWS AND RUDDER SIGNALS TO TEE GPC. TKERE ARE TWO
RPTAs MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE RUDDER PEDALS.
B_.F_I_ N_T_ _(_ 2/_): F_LUI_ U?-A SECOND RPTA RESULTS IN THE
LOSS OF RUDDER (CSS) CONTROL WHICH IS CRITICAL TO DIRECTIONAL
CONTROL DURING MAIN GEAR ROLLOUT BEFORE NGTD. THE LOSS OF
DIRECTIONAL COBOL WOULD RESET IN THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/V_HICLE.
AFTER NGTD (CRIT 3/IR): FAILURE OF A SECOND RPTA WOULD RESULT IN
THE LOSS OF THE GPC (CSS) MODF OF NWS.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS NOT AVA/LABLE. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF
STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
THE AUTO MODE OF GPC NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE IF A MSBLS IS
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: GN&C 304 (CRIT 2/IR)
C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLI GHT: 2/ IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOX, NWS CONTROL - FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NwS
2) STEERING CONTROL BOX
3) FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY: FAULT DETECTORS (5)/FAIL
DETECTOR
4)
S)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDWIFUNC _0RT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFI'NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
21VSIAI6; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0058-0015
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCX, ELECTRICAL/RESISTOR SHORT
IF ANY OF THE FIVE FAULT DETECTOR FAILS ON, TKE FAIL DETECTOR
WILL LATCH ON. FAILURE ON W-ILL RESULT IN AN AUTOMATIC DOWNMODE OF
NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND T_ _CIATION OF THE Nws FAIL
LIGHT. --
T_ DI_ZCT MODE OF m_S _LL ALSO F_Z. R_mDER COWn_oL or THE
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN TS_ RUDDER BECOMES -
INEYFECT!'V_.
REFERENCES •
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DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS _GHT: 3/ 3
MDAC ID: 202 ABORT: 3/3
i_x. _ _ox, mqs cowmoL- F_Um_ D_CXXON CXRCUI_
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NWS
2) STEERING CONTROL BOX
3) FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY: FAULT DETECTORS (5)/FAIL
DETECTOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/ 3
INA TAL: _3IS
/NA AOA: 3/3
/NA ATO: /NA
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ]
21vsLu6; _os__Z_a STR_
MC621-0058-00i5
c [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL/RESISTOR OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE TRIPLE CHANNEL WRAPAROUND FEEDBACK TRANSDUCER LOGIC PROVIDES
PROTZCTiON IN_ NO_ GPC iIODE OF OPERATION. THE-?AILING OFF
OF THE CONTROL BOX LOGIC HAS NO EFFECT ON THE NORMAL OPERATING
MODE OF NWS.
FAILING OFF OF THE CONTROL LOGIC IN THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS
_TS IN THE_ _O_S O? 0_ OR_MORE 'OF T_ ?_VE N6N-RED_D_T
DETECTOR TYPES.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTRO _',OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL Bi_AKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS _ STILL AVAILS.
REFERENCES :
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
ITEM: BOX, STEERING CONTROL - PILOT VALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED (PROVIDES A PREMATURE GROUND)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTE!N
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) Nws
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
STEERING CONTROL BOX
PILOT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFt'OFF: /NA
0NGR_IT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART_BER:
21VSlA16; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MCS21-0058_dd1_ .....
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
E,r  S/RA ION U,:
THE PILOT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUITS ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE THE NWS
ACTUATOR PILOT VALVES BY RESPECTIVELY PROVIDING OR REMOVING __
GROUNDS TO THE PILOT VAL_ZE SOLENOIDS' _ SOURCS. IF 0i%'EOF THE
I
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CIRCUITS FAILS CLOSED, ONE OF THE PILOT VALVES IS PREMATURELY
ACTIVATED (OPENED). THERE IS NO EFFECT ON NWS BECAUSE THE SECOND
PILOT VALVE PREVENTS HYDRAULIC ACTIVATION OF THE ACTUATOR UNTIL
NWS A_I-V)%TION. °
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING _T IS STILL AVAILABLE,
REFERENCES :
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_DEP_D_NT 0R_ITL_ _SESSMENT
HIGH_ST CRITICALITYDATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 204 ABORT:
Box, 0  oL- v vE co o .
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO PROVIDE A GROUND)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
HDW/FUNC
2/!R
2/LR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
STEF.RING CONTROL BOX
PILOT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LII_TOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] S [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
21VSIAI6; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0058-0015
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PILOT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUITS ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE THE NWS
ACTUATOR PILOT VALVES BY RESPECTIVELY PROVIDING OR REMOVING
GROUNDS TO THE PILOT VALVE SOLENOIDS' POWER SOURCE. IF ONE OF THE
CIRCUITS FAILS OPEN, A GROUND IS NOT PROVIDED TO ONE OF THE
ACTIVATION SOLENOIDS, ITS ASSOCIATED PILOT VALVE WILL CLOSE, NWS
W-ILL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE TO _ CASTOR MODE AND TEE NWS FAIL
LIGHT WILL ANNUNCIATE.
TEE DIRECT MODE OF NWS W-ILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER TH_ VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
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DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHZST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 2/ IR
MDAC ID: 205 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: BOX, STEERING CONTROL - STEERING SIGNAL OUTPUT
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OR PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
STEERING CONTROL BOX
STEERING SIGNAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI_OFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDINGISAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: 21VSlAI6; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0015
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE,
ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NWS CONTROL BOX PERFORMS TEE FINAL PROCESSING OF THE NWS
SIGNALS. TH_ LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD RESULT IN A MISCOMPARE BETWEEN
THE COMMANDED POSITION AND THE FEEDBACK POSITION, RESULTING IN AN
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AUTOMATIC DOWNMODE TO FREE CASTOR MODE AND THE ANNUNCIATION OF
TEE FAIL LIGHT.
THE D_CT MODE OF NWS WOULD ALSO FAII_ RUDDER CONTROL OF
VEHIC_=I_ A-V_AI-LAB_LE AT EF_CT-I_E S_DS_ DIFFERENT_IAL B_NG
M_ST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN TEE RUDDER BECOMES
IAEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
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DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT: 2/IR
ZTm_: BOX, STE_G CO_:R0__- STZmU'_C SIGN;_ outPUT
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAViLLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2_
3)
4)
S)
S)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
STEERING CONTROL BOX
STF.ERING SIGNAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FT.TGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/LR
.._FTOFF: INA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: 21VSIAI6; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0015
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT SIGNAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE PART FAILURE, ELECTRICAL CLOSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NWS CONTROL BOX PERFORMS THE FINAL PROCESSING OF THE NWS
SIGNALS. _ LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD RESULT IN A MISCOMPARE BETWEEN
THE COMMANDED POSITION AND THE FEEDBACK POSITION, RESULTING IN AN
AUTOMATIC DOWN"MODE TO FREE CASTOR MODE AND THE ANNUNCIATION OF
THE FAIL LIGHT ......
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WOULD ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SP_S.-r_IFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE _ THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFE_IVE. ..................................
REFERENCES:
C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT W
DAT_: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACCUMULATOR/C0MPENSATOR
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/].R
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2_
3)
4)
S>
6)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
COMPENSATOR/ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/_R
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/IR
2/1R
/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A C 2 ] B[F] cCP]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PIECE PART FAILURE (POPPET)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURPOSE OF TH_ ACCUMULATOR IS TO MAINTAIN A CONSTANT
BACKPRESSURE ON THE STEERING DAMPING SYSTEM TO PREVENT CAVITATION
OF THZ STEERING ACTUATOR DURING FREE CASTOR DAMPING. FAILING
....ACCUMULATOR OPEN HAS _O EFFECT AS OPEN _S_T_I__P_
POSITION FOR THE AC_TOR DURING_WS.
FAILING THE ACCUMULATOR OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR (DAMPING MODE)
RESULTS IN THE CAVITATION OF THE ACTUATOR, THE TOTAL LOSS OF
mS ACTUATOR SHIMMY DAMPING-CA_ILITY,AND _ POSSIBLE LOSS
OF THE ORBITER VEHICLE.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS S%ILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILAB_ AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENT_ BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ACCUMULATOR/COMPENSATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
COMPENSATOR/ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PIECE PART FAILURE (POPPET)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURPOSE OF THE ACCUMULATOR IS TO MAINTAIN A CONSTANT
BACKPRESSURE ON THE STEERING DAMPING SYSTEM TO PREVENT CAVITATION
OF TKE STEERING ACTUATOR DURING FREE CASTOR DAMPING. FAILING THE
ACCUMULATOR CLOSED PREVENTS THE RETURN OF FLUID FROM THE ACTUATOR
TO HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1. TH_ RESULTING PRESSURE BUILDUP WOULD
_THIBIT THE ACTUATOR CONTROL OF THE NOSE WHEEL, TRIP A FAULT
DETECTION CIRCUIT, DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATE THE
NWS FAIL LIGHT.
FAILURE CLOSED DURING FREE _TOR HAS NO EFFECT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL=OF-_
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEF.RING POSITION AMPLIFIER (SPA)
CRITICA/_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] -
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80VSIA31; AVIONICS BAY No. 2
MC621-0043-3641
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS
OF/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SPA AMPLIFIES NOSE WHEEL POSITION SIGNALS FROM TEE SPT AND
TRANSMITS THEM TO THE NW POSITION SOP ON THREE REDUNDANT
CHANNELS. THE LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL HAS NO EFFECT - RM WILL AVENGE
TH_ REMAINING VALUES TO PRODUCE GOOD OUTPUT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFEC_=IVE SPEEDS. pIFF_IAL B_ING IS
A MODE OF _"S_TEER_ING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
  OSiTIO.(sPA)
r umx MODE: LOSS OF O. cm m' L
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION AMPLIFIER (SPA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/YUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
t
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 80VSlA31; AVIONICS BAY No. 2
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3641
CAUSES: V_BRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS
OF/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEE SPA AMPLIFIES NOS_E W_EL POS_T!ON SIGNALS FROM _ SPT AND
TRANSMITS TH__M TO TEE q_W_SZTION SOP ON THieVE REDt_D _ .......
CHANNELS. THE LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL HAS NO EFFECT - RM WILL AVERAGE
THE REMAINING VALUES TO PRODUCE GOOD OUTPUT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF _WS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT 0RBI_ ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/LR
ITEM: AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
_S ....
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION AMPLIFIER (SPA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE EDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ IR
LI3"TOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAYING: 31 LR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80VSlA31; AVIONICS BAY No. 2
MC621-0043-3641
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS
OFIIM_oPER INI_'T
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
SPA FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF WRAPAROUND FEEDBACK PROTECTION
IN THE GPC MODE OF NWS. THIS FAILURE LEADS TO A MISCOMPARE .....
BETWEEN COMMAND AND FEEDBACK SIGNALS IN THE NW POSITION SOP. THE
SOP WOULD DOWNMODE NWS BY INHIBITING THE ENABLE 1 AND 2 DISCRETES
AND ILLUMINATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT VIA AN MDM FF4 DISCRETE.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS_IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDD_ CONTROL_., OF_ THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
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DATE" 11117186
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM: AMPLIFIER, STE_G POSITION (SPA)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OR PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION AMPLIFIER (SPA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
0NORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: _= /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : At1] BCP] cCP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
.80VSlA31; AVIONICS BAY No. 2
MC621-0043-3641
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS OF
OR IMPROPER INPUT
E_FECTS/RATIONALE:
SPA FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF WRAPAROUND FEEDBACK PROTECTION
SOP WOULD DOWNMODE NWS BY INHIBITING THE ENABLE 1 AND 2 DISCRETES
AND ILLUMINATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT VIA AN MDM FF4 DISCRETE.
THE DII%ECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAI_ _RUDDER C0_OL OF THE
VF/4ICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS, DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
i
REFERENCES :
w
C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 307 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, ACTUATOR - HYDRAULIC HOUSING
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
m
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVlLLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN ..
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NWS __
2) NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY "
3) ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY HYDRAULIC HOUSING
4)
S)
S)
V)
8)
9) m
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
/NA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
k _
c[p] ....
U
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE ....
EFFE_SIRATIONALE: i _--
A RUPTURE IN THE ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC HOUSING WOULD RESULT IN A I
LOSS OI_%_RESSURE _ THE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY THAT W0_ _SULT-IN
y
THZ LOSS OF NWS, I"Y TEE RUPTURE CAUSED _ STEERING RESPONSE TO _i
__ WHERE THE PO_-_ON _ER_O_'EI'__ SET
TOLERANCE LEVEL, THE DETECTION CIRCUITRY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATE TEE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
DI_ MODE OF NWS WILL _O FAI_ _5 _ ...... _
A RUPT_q_ CAN ALSO CAUSE A TOTAL LOSS OF _ SHIMMY DAMPING
CAPABILITY OF THE ACTUATOR AND RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE. _
REFE_ESCES :
C-22
wi
ASSESSME 
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: I/I
ABORT: I/I
rm , PISTON,AC UAT0 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA S_'BSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
S)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR ARM/PISTON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /HA
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY S CRZENS: A [ i ] _[P] c[P]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-00i_ (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY')
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, BROKEN/LOSS OF MECHANICAL
LINKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE ACTUATOR PISTON IS A MECHANICAL ARM THAT LINKS THE ACTUATOR
TO THE COLLAR OP THE NOSE WHEEL STRUT_F_AT _STH_ N0_E WI_"EL.
IF THE ARM STICKS/JAMS, THE RESULTING POSITION MISCOMPARE WILL
TRIP AN ERROR DETECTION LOGIC CIRCUIT, DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE
CASTOR MODE AND ANNUNCIATE TEE NWS FAIL LIGHT. FAILING THE
ACTUATOR PISTON JAMMED MAY NOT BE C0NSID_D A CI%EDIB_ FAILURE
MODE (MANUFACTURER OPINION).
T_E DIRECT MODE OF STEERING WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
V_HICLE AND DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING MAY NOT BE EFFECTIVE MODES OF
STEERING THE VEHICLE WITH THE ACTUATOR ARM FAILED HARD OVER.
REFERENCES :
C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
ITEM: PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RESPOND (BROKEN LINKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: AS _DIAVILLA S_YS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
_==
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR ARM/PISTON
Z
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBYT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACTUATOR PISTON ARM IS A MECHANICAL ARM THAT LINKS THE
ACTUATOR TO THE COLLAR OF THE NOSE WHEEL STRUT T_IA_T+TU_S THE
NOSE W_IEEL. T_LOSSOF_J_I_[LTN_GE CAUSES THE LOSS OF NWS_
AND ALL SHIMMY DAMPING CAPABILITY TO THE NOSE WHEEL RESULTING IN
THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE I_ AVAI__=E_IvE SPEEDS$-_I___I/CI_G
MUST BE USED TO S_ER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
J
m
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B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
z-mW/_mc
2/1R
2/1._
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFF VALVE)
FAILS TO FILTER (FAILS OPEN)
AS M_DL_VILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
S)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER (SHUTOFF VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCR: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LII_EOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] sCFi cCP 
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUAT01_ ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: OVERLOADED, OVERUSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
TEE INLET FILTER FILTERS THE HYDRAULIC FLUID ENTERING THE
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY. IF IT FAILS OPEN ALL THE VALVES IN THE
ACTUATOR ASS_BLY ARE _CTT0 CONTAMINATION THATWO_ RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF NWS' THE RESULTING CONTAMINATION WOULD ALSO
DEGRADE SHIMMY DAMPING IN TEE FREE CASTOR MODE.
THE DIRECT MODE oOF NWS _ _O FAIL. RUDD_ CON'I_ qL OF
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
H
i
m
C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 3ii
HIGHEST CRITI__
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
2/LR
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFF VALVE)
FAILS CLOSED (BLOCKED)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
;)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER (SHUTOFF VALVE)
CRITICAZ_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
aEDU D CY SC EENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: 21VSlA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBL¥);NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: OVERLOADED, OVERUSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE INLET FILT_ FILTERS TEE HYDRAULIC FLUID __NG THE
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY. IF IT FAILS CLOSED, THE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC
PRESSURE WOULD RESULT IN--LOSS OF_NWS. FAILUR_DETEq/_ION_
CIRCUITRY W_LL AUTOMAT!_Y DO,ODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND
I
L
R
m
B
R
i
m
u
m
ANNUNCIATE TR_ NWS FAIL LIGHT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL_- RUDDER CONTROL OF
V_CLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFE_IVE SPEEDS. DIFF_IAL _B_G
m
mm
MUST BE USED TO STEER _ VEHICLE W'HEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
m
m
m
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INDEPZNDm ORBITER  SESSMENT
DATE: 11/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 312
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
I/I
ITEM: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PEASE HDWIFUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SiP] C[P]
LOCATION: 21VSlA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-00iO (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A RUPTURE IN THE HOSE ASSEMBLY OF THE NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY WOULD
RESULT IN A LOSS OF PRESSURE IN THE ASSEMBLY THAT WOULD CAUSE THE
LOSS OP NWS._ _P'_ TH__'_"dk_US-_ ___ 1%EsPoUsE TO ....
D_IORATE TO A _'E--L WHERE THE POSI--TION _O_ E,_ED TEE SET
TOLERANCE, THE FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND _CIATE THE NW S FAIL LIGHT.
A RUPTURE CAN ALSO CAUSE A TOTAL LOSS OF THE SHIMMY DAMPING
CAPABILITY OF THE ACTUATOR AND RESULT IN THE LOSS OF "_[E VEHICLE.
RUDDER CONTROL __F THE __S AVAI_LE AT E_"FECTI_ E- SPEEDs.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE
RUDDER BECOMES INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
E
w
C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 313 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (BLOCKED)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B[PI C[PI
LOCATION: 21VSlA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: ....M_2i-_0_Yd-(AcTuATOR _SEMBLY)
_AUSES: CONTAMINATION
A BLO__ I"B_THE NNqS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY WOULD RESULT IN A
LOSS OF PRESSURE IN THE ASSEMBLY THAT WOULD CAUSE THE LO_ OF
NWS. IF THE BLOCKAGE CAUSED THE STEERING RESPONSE TO DETERIORATE
I
I
B
B
J
D
M
I
m :
TO A _L WHERE_I'_I"_DSITION_ERRDR EX_ _ SETTOLEPANCE,
m_
6_
THE FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE NWS
TO FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. IF THE
-HYDRAULIC PRESSURE FIRST FELL NEAR i000 PSI_, _P_ SW_TCH
WOULD OPEN AND ANNUNCIATE TEE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENT_ BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEE_ THE VEHICLE _ _ RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
C-28
ww
w
I_EP_D_r_ O_I_ _ss_ssH_rr
DATE: 11/17/85
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 314
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: SW_TC_, PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD AN_ST: AS MEDL_VI_ SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: _ /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAI_ING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/1R
2/IR
iNA
REDUNDANCY S_REENS: A C I ] sCP] ccP]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22SI; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (AeraToR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, BINDING
EPFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........
THE PRESSURE SWITCH AFFECTS TEE HARDWIRED PATH FOR THE
ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL SWITCH AND THE NWS ACTIVE DISCRETE
THAT IS TRANSMITTErDTO_ HOSE_EL_POSXTION SOP. THE FAILED
OPEN SWITCH WILL ANNUNCIATE TEE FAIL LIGHT AND TEE CREW WILL
DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL STILL BE AVA_LA_B_LE B_UT THE NWS FAIL LIGHT
WILL REMAIN ANNUNCIATED, RUDDER CON_gL OF THE VEHICLE IS
AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF
STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
w
m
w
m
m
C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 315
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
nUGHT PraiSE a_W/_C _ ABORT _mw/nmc
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
01_GRBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
_IT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREWS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22SI; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ....
6
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, BINDING
EFFECTS/RA_ONALE: _ _ _ _ _i_
THE PRESSURE SWITCH AFFECTS THE HARDWIRED PATH FOR THE
ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL SWITCH AND TEE NWS ACTIVE DISCRETE
THAT IS TRANSMITTED TO THE NOSE WEEEL POSITION SOP. THE FAILED
U
m
l
m
II
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m
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z
!
!
D
Z
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Ej_
lCLOSZD PRESSURE SWITCH WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON NWS EXCEPT THE LOSS
OF OB'E PATH OF FAILURE DETECTION CAPABILITY. GPC WRAPAROUND EARLY
FAILURE DETECTION IS STILL ACTIVE. THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS iS
-STILL AVAILASLE 'SUT_ PRESSURE.,-_ _WrrcrT_-Em_i__ _
ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. DETECTION OF A SECOND NWS
FAILURE MAY BE AFTER THE FACT, MAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION MORE TIME
CRITICAL. _...._ _
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTZAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
C-30
Wm
m
Z
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: $i6
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/;UNC
2/LR
2/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
s)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
FEEDBACK TRANSDUCER
FLIGHT PEASE HDW/rUNC
PRELAUNCR: /NA
LIlt'OFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
L_DI_G/S_ING: 2/L_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ]
..........__TIES
_O_T " /lIDWlFm_c
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/1R
AOA: 2/1R
ATO: /NA
B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 21VSI_2MTI; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: V_BRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE
(SEPARATED COIL), ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FEEDBACK (FB) TRANSDUCER TRANSMITS AN ELECTRICAL SIGNAL TO
VOLTAGE PROPORTIONAL TO THE NOSEGEAR COLLAR ROTATIONAL VELOCITY.
FAILURE OF THE FB TRANSDUCER WOULD TRIP THE RATE/DIRECTION AND/OR
THE OPEN/SHORT DETECTION CIRCUITS IN THE NWS CONTROL BOX,
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS W_LL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS _VAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. D_IAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
z
C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT u
DATE: Zi117/S6
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 317
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/LR
ZTEM: TRANSDUCER, _DBACK
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
FEEDBACK TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
_'LzGHT _Z m_w/_e .......
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
_ZT: /NA " ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/_J-NC
2/1R
2/L_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] RIP] C[P]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22MTI; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ....
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, DEFORMED COIL, ELECTRICAL
SHORT ..... _ ..........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
T£E FEEDBACK (FB) TRANSDUCER TRANSMITS AN ELECTRICAL SIGNAL TO
TEE NWS CONTROL BOX WHERE IT IS DIYFERENTIATZD TO OBTAIN _A
FAILURE OF THE FB TRANSDUCER WOULD TRIP THE RATE/DIRECTION AND/OR
THE OPEN/SHORT DETECTION CIRCUITS IN TH_ NWS CONTROL BOX,
DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
b---_m__ _ _ArL _fbDER C0NT_OL OF _
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EY?ECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE JEMICLE WHEN THE RUDD_ BECOMES ...........
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
I
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C-32
I
OR ITE ASSESSHEn
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DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 318 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, _G POSITION (SPT)
FAILURE MODE: SINGLE CF_%NNEL NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVI_ SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER (SPT)
mUTICALITIZS
FLIGHT PHASE HEW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ S
LII_TOFF: /NA TAL: 3/ 3
0NORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] [NA ] C [SA _]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81VSIA30; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0043-3740
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE
(SEPARATED COIL), ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER SENDS NOSE WHEEL POSITION
TRANSDUCERS. FAILING ONE TRANSDUCXR CHANNEL HAS NO EFFECT (RM
WILL AVERAGE THE REMAINING TWO SIGNALS TO PRODUCE GOOD OUTPUT).
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVKILA_LE AT E_FECTIVE SPEEDS. D_IAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 319
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT)
FAILURE MODE: SINGLE CHANNEL ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ws .......
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER (SPT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE EDWl?UNC
PRELAUNCH: INA
LIFTOFF: INA
_: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: 81VSlA30; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC62i-0043-_ 0 ........_
_ORT HDW/ruNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /NA
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, DEFORMED COIL, ELECTRICAL
SHORT ......._
THE STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER SENDS NOSE WHEEL POSITION
SIGNALS TO TEE STEERING POSITION AMPLIFIER USING THREE REDUNDANT
m
B
m
U
i
m
I
W _
D
W _
WILL AVERAGE THE REMAINING TWO SIGNALS TO PRODUCE GOOD OUTPUT).
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHIC_LEI_SAYAILABLE AT EF_CTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MGDEOP STE_q_G THAT IS_ST_LLAVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
g -
U
C-34
ww
m
3E
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: II/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 320 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF SPT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/LR
3/LR
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER (SPT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
_ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAF_NG: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY: SCREENS: A [ i _ B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81VSlA30; NOSE G_AR STRUT
MC621-0043-3740
CAUSES: LOSS OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE
EPFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER (SPT) SENDS NOSE WHEEL POSITION
SIGNALS TO THE STEERING POSITION AMPLIYIER USING THREE REDUNDANT
TRANSDUCERS. FAILURE OF THE SPT WILL CAUSE A MISCOMPARE IN TH_
NOSE WHEEL POSITI_-N SOP; DOWNMODE NWS TO FREE CASTOR BY
INHIBITING NWS ENABLE 1,2 DISCRETES; AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL
LZG_T VmA AN MDM _'4 DZSC_T_,
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
m
C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 321
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: _SDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE SPT
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
STEERING POSITION TRANSDUCER (SPT)
FLIGHT _E
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
DITORBIT: /NA
/NA
LANDING/SAFING: 31 IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITI_TIE_
HDW/FU}[C ABORT _w/r_wc
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/iR
ATO: /NA
A[I] RIP] C[P]
LOCATION: 81VSIA30; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3740 _ _ _
CAUSES: SHORTS COIL TO COIL (VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCE3
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
sz_z_._ To _m s_ma POSITION _P_F:ER USIN_ _m_E R_O_ro_
m_NSDUC_RS. FAI_ OF T_ S_ _LL CAUSE A MISCOMP_ :_ rm_
NOSE_ PO_ON_-SOP_:-'D0WNMODE NWS TO FRES _C3STOR BY_ .....
INHIBITING NWS ENABLE i,2 DISCRETES; AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL
LIGHT VIA AN MDM FF4 DISCRETE.
THE D_CT MODE_OFTW_S IS STILL AVXI"L;_LE. RUDDER CO}_'ROL OF THE
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
W
W
D
z
J
g
J
g
m
D
m
J
mm
g
j
C-36
L ,
r
w
L
w
r
m
w
E
U
_EPENDE_ oRSITER ASSESSHENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 322
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/12
2/12
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, ANTILCAVITATION CHECK
FAILS OPEN/LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
21
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK VALVE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/_C
2/12
2/12
2/12
INA
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-00_8-0010 (A_ATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEE ANTI-CAVITATION VALVES(2) ARE FREE FLOATING BALL VALVES THAT
PREVENT CAVITATION OF THE ACTUATOR DURING FREE CASTOR AND PREVENT
.......................................... DEGREDATION IN TU_INGTHE VALVES FAIL OPEN, THE RESULT WILL BE A
RESPONSE. IF THE NOSE WHEEL POSITION ERROR EXCEEDS THE SET
TOLERANCE, THE DETECTION LOGIC W'ILLAUTOMATICALL¥ DOWNMODE HWS TO
FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABL_ AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIALBRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 323
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK VALVE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE KDW/I_ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC521-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WATER HAMMER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE _-CAVTTATION VALVES(2) ARE FREE FLOATING _ VALVES THAT
PREVENT CAVITATION OF THE ACTUATOR DURING FREE CASTOR AND PREVENT
HIGH PRESSURE FLUID FROM ENTERING THERE_ LINE PP_EMATURELY. IF
THE VALVE_ FAIL CLOSED, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON NWSA_LOSED 7S
THE NORMAL OPERATING MODE FOR TH_ VALVES DURING NWS.
FAILED CLOSED DURING FREE CASTOR WOULD RESULT IN A DEGREDATION IN
SHIMMY DAMPING. _ _ _-_ .........__ " - !_°;_-!_T_,-_--__ _..... _._ -_ _-_ ,_
Y_ CLOSED MAYNOT 3E COnSiDERED A CREDIBLE PAl"LURE M0-D-E.
TH_ DIRECT MODE OF mS IS STI_ AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A _MODE OF STEER_ THAT_S STILL AVAILAB_. I_? ........
REFERENCES :
U
m
U
m
B
mm
D
mm
w
u
C-38
I_E;_'D_ ORBITER _SESsMm_
=
w
w
L_
i
E
w
L_
w
l
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 324
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE, E-H SERVO
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RESPOND/OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA sussYs IZAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) NWS
2) ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
3) ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC SERVO VALVE: PILOT VALVE/SHUTTLE
VALVE/CONTROL COILS
4)
5)
4)
v)
8)
9)
....... CRI=TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCR: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LII_TOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 21VS!A22LV3; }_OSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 "(ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, ME_I_CAL SHOCK, OPEN CONTROL COIL, LOSS OF
CONTROL SIGNAL, CONTAMINATION
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
....THE= E-H VALVE +ME_ FLUID TO THE ACTUATOR PISTON_................BALANCE AREA IN
RESPONSE TO ELECTRICAL SIGNALS FROM THE NWS CONTROL BOX. IF THE
E-H VALVE FAILS, THE NOSE WHEEL WILL EITHER FAIL TO MOVE, OPERATE
ERRATICALLY, OR FAIL HARD OVER. THE CONTROL BOX FAILURE DETECTION
DOWNMODE TO FREE CASTOR, AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILY. ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE
IS AVAI_LE AT EFFECIZV+_ SPEEDS, DIFFERENTIAL B_NC MUST BE
USE_ TO +S_E_ _ +_EHICL2 __N_ _+R--UDD_- _ECO_E_°_FFECT_VE.
REFERENCES:
C-39
INDEP__ O_I_ _SESSM_ I
DA_: 11/17/86
S_SYS_M: _S
MDAC ID: 325
HIG_ST _TI__
_G_:
MORT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
2/IR
I_:
F__ MODE:
V_, E-K
__C _S_NSE/__T_ OP_TION
_¥ST: _ MED_VI_ _SYS _: A HO_TE_
_0_ HI__:
l) NWS
2) A_ATOR _SEMBL¥
3) ET_O-_D_IC S_VO V_VE: PI_T V_VE/S_T_
V_VE/CO_OL COi_
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
_TI_TIES
_G_ P_E _W/_C _ORT _W/_C
__: /NA R_: 2/
_OFF: /NA T_: 2/
ON0_IT: /NA AOA: 2/_
DEO_IT: /NA ATO: /NA
__GIS_G: 2/_ ._ _ :
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
_TION: 21VS_2LV3; NOSE G_ S_
P_ _B_: MC621-O058-0010 (A_ATOR __SEMBL¥)
_USES: VI_TION, ___ SHO_, DEFO_D/SHOR_D COIL,
_V_T_ _ SIGN_, CO_INATION .....
E_S/_TION_:
E-H V_ MET_ _UID TO _ A_ATOR PISTON __ _ IN
_S_NSE _ ET__ SIGN_ _OM _ _S COBOL _X. IF
E-H V_VZ F_, _ NOSE _EL _ EI_ F_L TO MOVE, OP_
_TI_Y, OR F_L _ 0_. _ COBOL BOX F_L_ DETE_ION
_GIC OR _ NOSE _EL _SITION SOP WIT.T. D_ _ FAIL_,
g
I
D
U
m
g
i
U
D
i
U
_ODE TO _ _TOR, _ _C_ _ _S F_L _.
D_ MODE OF _S _7._. _O F_L. R_D_ COBOL OF _ V_ICT_
IS AV_T_ AT EF_IVE SPEEDS. DIFF__ B_G _ST BE
USED TO STE_ _ VEHICT_ _ _ RUDD_ BECOMES _F_I_.
_F__S :
m -"
g
J
C-40
U --
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
m
w
W
m
F
L
r
W
w
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 326 ABORT:
ITEM: VALVE, E-H PROTECTION CHECK (RETURN LINE
ISOLATION)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/LR
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
E-H PROTECTION CHECK VALVE (RETURN LINE ISOLATION VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LI)'TOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/IR
2/L_
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE (SPRING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE E-H PROTECTION VALVE IS A BALL/SPRING VALVE THAT PREVENTS
REVERSE PLOW _N THE RETURN LINE FROM THE ACCUMULATOR TO THE E-H
SERVO VALVE. IF THE VALVE FAILS OPEN DURING NWS THERE IS NO
EFFECT. OPEN IS THE NORMAL OPERATING MODE FOR THE VALVE DURING
NWS.
IF THE VALVE FAILS PRIOR TO LANDING GEAR DEPLOY, HIGH PRESSURE
BUILDUP DURING LANDING GEAR DEPLOY COULD DAMAGE THE SERVO VALVE
FI_T STAGE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF NWS DURING ROLLOUT.
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR, THERE IS SOME DEC REDAT_0N OF
SHIMMY DAMPING CAPABILITY.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL IF THE E-H VALVE IS
DAMAGED. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE
SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAN BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE
WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES :
C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 327
KIGH_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/IR
ITEM:
ISOLATION)
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION CHECK (RETURN LINE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA s_sYs _: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
_)
4)
s)
6)
7)
a)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
E-H PROTECTION CHECK VALVE (RETURN LINE ISOLATION VALVE)
.........CR/TI CALI TI_S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
_N_RBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] sCP] ccP]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE (SPRING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE E-H PROTECTION VALVE IS A BALL/SPRING VALVE THAT PREVENTS
_E FLOW IN THE RETURN LINE FROM THE ACCUMULATOR TO THE E-H
SERVO VALVE. IF THE VALVE FAILS CL_SE_-DURI_TG NWS, THE RESULTTNG
BU_LUP OF PRESSURE IN THE RETURN LINE WOULD INHIBIT STEERING
RESPONSE AND TRIP AN ERROR DETECTION CIRCUIT, AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODING NWS TO FREE CASTOR AND ANNUNCIATING THE NWS FAIL
LIGHT. ..................-_-'__ ............................--_ -
FAILURE CLOSED DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
THE D_I_RECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE _SPUDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
RE_"RENCES :
D
u
I
w
g
I
u
u
u
I
w
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
w
w
w
w
!
w
L_
w
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 328
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
I-IDW/nmC
2/1R
2/1R
ZTm_: VALVE, OVERLOAD CRECX (2 OF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN/LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVXLLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
OVERLOAD CHECK VALVES (2)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: / IR
LANDING/SAFI'NG: 2/LR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_UNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAr,: 2/LR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: /NA
A[ I] B[P] C[P]
_TION:
P_TNUMBER:
21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLM)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATI ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OVERLOAD CHECK VALVES ARE FREE FLOATING BALL VALVES THAT
RELIEVE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE BUILDUP ON THE OPERATIONAL SIDE OF THE
ACTUAT6_ASS_LY._ _S_ '_W0-N-6_Ng.ED__ VALES _CH PROTECT A
SEPA_AT2 _L_N_. _?_ V)_LV_-?A-I_ 0_EN DURING NWS, THE SUPPLY
PRESSURE WOULD HAVE A DIRECT PATH TO THE RETURN LINE RESULTING IN
A LOSS OF STEERING PRESSURE THAT COULD TRIP AN ERROR DETECTION
CIRCUIT, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODING NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND
ANNUNCIATING THZ NWS FAIL LIGHT.
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER TH_ VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: Ii/17/8 S
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 329
HIGHEST CHITICALITY
F_GHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, OVERLOAD C_CK (2 OF)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
S)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
OVERLOAD CHECX VALVES (2)
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/_
DEORBIT: /IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFT.NG: • 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: 21VS!A22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WATER HAMMER
TH_ OV_R/._AD __AL_S _ _ FLOATING BALL V_S-_T
RELIEVE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE BUILDUP ON THE OPERATIONAL SIDE OF THE
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY- EACH PROTECTING A SEPARATE LINE. TH_ VALVES
_"AI_G CLOSED HAVE _IMM.EDIATE EFFECT ON NWS;-HOWEVER,
g
J
m
g
I
mm
g
EXCESSIVE PRESSURE BUILDUP (i.e. TIRE HITTING A BUMP/ROCI9 WILL
RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY AND THE LOSS OF NWS.
FAILURE CLOSED DURING FREE CASTOR HAS ND EFFECT. _ _ .......
TYPE OF VALVE. _:_ ........_ ................................
TH_DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL UNDER SIMILAR _::: _
CIRCUMSTA/_CES. -_RUDDER--C0NTROL OF __ IS A___AT
EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. _ THER_DDER BE_MES INE_CTIVE, _ _....
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE IF NWS IS
NOT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
C-44
z
m
m
w
!
_DEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
w
w
J
F
w
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m
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 330
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVZLLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
¢)
";)
S)
9)
NWS
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PILOT VALVE i: PILOT VALVE/ACTIVATION SOLENOID
CRITZCALITIZS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LII_TOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22LVI (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (_CTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIEC_ PART FAILURE (SPRING), SHORTED
SOLENOID SIGNAL, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_=:PILOT__:VALVE 10_S, THE NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY'S SHUTOFF
VALVE OPENS WHICH HYDRAULICALLY ENERGIZES THE ASSEMBLY. IF PZLOT
VALVE _1_FAZL_ _0PEN,_THE_ _ _N0"E-FF_cT_S 0P_ TS _ _ORHAL
OPE_TING POSITION FOR T_ VALVE D_ING _'WS._N T_E EVENT OF
SECOND FAILURE, PILOT VALVE 2 CAN STILL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE
NWS _ THE FREE CASTOR MODE.
TKE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHIC_= TS_AV_LR AT EFFECTZVE_ SPE_E_DS-_DIFFERENTIAL B_NG IS
A MODE 0..*STEERING THAT IS °STIIIt_A-VAZLABL_. =
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
L_
r _
w
C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 331
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 1
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
NWS
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PILOT VALVE i: PILOT VALVE/ACTIVATION SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SA21"NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22LVI (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-00!0 (_ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) _-:!_
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, LOSS OF CONTROL SIGNAL (OPEN
COIL)
EFFECTS/RATI0_:
WHEN PILOT VALVE 1 OPENS, THE NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY'S SHUTOFF
VALVE OPENS WHICH HYDRAULICALLY ENERGIZES THE ASSEMBLY. IF PILOT
VALVE 1 FAI_CLOSED __S, THE SHUTOFF VALVE W!_LL CLOSE
WHICH PREVENTS HYDRAULIC PRESSURE FROM ENTERING THE ACTUATOR
ASSEMBLY. NWS WILL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE TO FREE CASTOR AND THE
PRESSURE SWITCH WILL OPEN - ANNUNCIATING THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
D_cr_ _ _'--_/S _t._ __0 :_IL.---__ " C_i_O_:_?-_'Y"_ '
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE _T EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEE_ THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
FAILURE CLOSED DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
m
J
i
g
l
R
l
n
mm
u
R
W
j
m _
C-46
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 332
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PILOT VALVE 2: PILOT VALVE/ACTIVATION SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22LV2 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC62i-0058-00i0 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE (SPRING), BINDING,
SHORTED SOLENOID SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_ T_AC'TIy_ATION OF PILOT VALVE 2 SUPPLIES TEE FrLDRAULIC PRESSURE
TOTHE A_TUATOR ASSEMBLY THAT OPENS THE BYPASSfiCONTROL _VALvEs AND
_S_S _ _HY__C_SS_SW_T_-IF _PILOT VALVE 2 FAILS
OPEN, THERE IS NO EFFECT AS OPEN IS THE NORMAL OPERATING POSITION
FOR TH_ VALVE DURING NWS. IN TEE EVENT OF A SECOND FAILURE, PILOT
VALVE 1 CAN STILL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR
MODE.
TEE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVKILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
_C_ _S AV_LE ATE??E_ JPEEDS. DIYTERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE O? __G _T IS-ST_LL AVAI_LE.
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT
REFERENCES :
C-47
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 333
H_GHEST CRITICALITY
FLI GET:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
2/12
2/12
ITEM: VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV_LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
=)
s)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
PILOT VALVE 2: PILOT VALVE/ACTIVATION SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/12
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/12
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/12
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: 21V51A22LV2 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; HOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, LOSS OF CONTROL SIGNAL (OPEN
COIL)
E  CTS/RATIONALZ:
THE ACTIVATION OF PILOT VALVE 2 SUPPLIES HYDRAULIC PRESSURE THAT
OPENS THE BYPASS/CONTROL VALVES AND CLOSES THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
I
g
m
J
g
l
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SWITCH. IF PILOT VALVE 2 FAILS CLOSED, THE BYPASS VALVES WILL
• C_SE WHICH PREVENTS FLUID FROM _G THE NWSA_C_A=TOR B_ALANCE J
AREA AND OPENS TH_ PRESSURE SWITCH WHICH ANNUNCIATES THE HWS FAIL
LIGHT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER C_NTROL OF THE
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
D
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 334
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT •
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAV7LLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
RELIEF/COWn_OL/BYPASS VALVES (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFT_NG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ABORT _W/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /NA
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
L
21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PIECE PART FAILURE (SPRING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE BYPASS VALVES CLOSE DURING FREE CASTOR AND SHUT OFF THE
HYDRAULIC LINES FROM THE E-H SERVO VALVE TO THE ACTUATOR BALANCE
EXCZPT ONE HARDWARE PATH FOR DOWNMODING NWS TO FREE CASTOR IS
LOST.
IF THE VALVES FAIL OPEN DURING _ _A_STOR, THERE IS SOME
DEGREDATION IN THZ SHIMMY DAMPING CAPABILITY OF TH_ SYSTEM.
TH_ DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFTECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKI_TG IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
m
C-49
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 335
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS VALVES (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA AT0: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY) ; NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, LOSS OF HYDRAULIC CONTROL
PRESSURE
ZFFECTS/RATION :
THE BYPASS VALVES CLOSE DURING FREX CASTOR AND SHUT OFF THE
HYDRAULIC LINES FROM TKE E-H SERVO VALVE TO THE ACTUATOR PISTON
BALANCE AREA. IF TEE VALVES FAIL CLOSED, HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL
NOT REACH THE ACTUATOR PISTON. THE RESULTING LOSS OF STEERING
RESPONSE WILL TRIP AN ERROR DETECTION CIRCUIT, AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODING NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND ANNUNCIATING THE NWS
FAIL LIG_._ _- __ .... T _ ___ _ _ .....
IF THE VALVES YAI"E C_SED IN FREE_TOR, THERE IS NO EFFECT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEERING THE VEHICLE WHEN THE RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES:
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 336
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_/NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, SHUTOFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVZLLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIerARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
S)
9)
NWS
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT KDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFZNGI 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 21VSIA22 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY); NOSE GEAR STRUT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0058-0010 (ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATZON', BINDING, PIECE PART FAILURE (SPRING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :'_ _ '
TEE SPRING LOADED SHUTOFF VALVE PORTS OR BLOCKS HYDRAULIC FLUID
TO TEE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY. IF THE VALVE FAILS OPEN THERE IS NO
_ST; _Pz:_---_V_'_ _:%0. _i__-%-T_:i:_f_,i-O_-Z _-l_; ......................
FAILURE OPEN DURING FREE CASTOR HAS NO EFFECT.
TH_ DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
A MODE OF STEI_ING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
R__CaS : ..................
e_=
B
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_DEP_D_ ORBI_ _SESSME_ II
_: ii/17/86
S_SYS_M: _S
MDAC ID: 337
HIG_ST _ITI__
F_ G_:
_RT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
2/IR
I_:
F__ MODE:
V_, S_OFF
F_ C_SED
_YST: _ M_VI_ S_YS LEAD: A HO_IN
B__ ___:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
s)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
_S A_ATOR _SEMBLY
S_OFF V_VE
_TI_TIES
_G_ _E _W/_C _RT _W/_C
P__: /NA RT7_: 2/
T.7_OFF: /NA T_: 2/_
ONO_IT: /NA AOA: 2/
DEO_IT: /NA ATO: /NA
_ING/S_G: 2/_
_D_D_ S_S: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_TION: 21V5_2 (A_ATOR _SEMBL¥); NOSE G_ S_
P_T _B_: MC621-0058-0010 (A_ATOR _SEMBL¥)
_USES: CO__ATION, B_ING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: -: _ ----_----_........... . ::.
S_NC LOADED S_OFF V_VE PORTS OR B_ _D_C _UID
TO _ A_ATOR _S_BL¥. IF _ V_ F_7_q C_SED, _D_IC
_SS_ _7.T. N_ _ _ A_ATOR PISTON __ _.
_S_TING _SS _ S_ING _S_NSE _ _P _ _OR DETECTION
CIR_T, A_O_TI_Y _ODE _S TO _ _E _TOR MODE
_C_ _ _S F_L _G_.
IF _ V_VE F_ _SED D_G _ _TOR _ IS NO EFFECT.
:_ _-b___S_LL ALSO FiU:_ _T_D-D_C_0__ _
V_CTE IS AV_T._. AT EF_IVE SPEEDS. DIFF_I_ B_NG
_ST LE USED TO STEWING _ V_ICT._ _EN _ R_DER BECOMES
INEFFECT_.
_F_NCES :
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- DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 401
ITEM:
FAILURE MODEz
LIGHT, NWS FAIL
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
sUBsYs_: A Ho__
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HII_ARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY (EPD&C)
NWS FAIL LIGHT
(_ITIr_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT EDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A3-XDS3; PANEL F3 (F2 ON OV-102)
MC434-0075-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, M_CHANICAL SHOCX, OPEN CONTACT
EYFECTS/RATIONALE •
IF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT FAILS OFF, EARLY FAILURE DETECTION
CAPABILITY IS LOST AND CREW RECOGNITION OF SECOND NWS FAILURE
WOU_--_E_:°_ THe _A_'-__G_IN THZ _EED F_R A_fORE TIME
___ _C_ __o_. ....... _ ...............................
Ts_ DIRECTMODEO_ Z_S _S ST_Z__VAIL_. R_DERCO_'mOLOF
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A _MODE _OF S_N_ _T IS_STiLL _V__. ...............
REYERENCES: EPD&C 3000 (CR_T 3/3)
C-53
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 402
HIGKEST CRITICALITY
FLI GEE:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED/PREMATURE SIGNAL (NWS FAIL LIGHT ON)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PR_LAUNCH: - /i_ - RT_- ............ 2fLR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 30V73AIS; FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: MC434-0283-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANTCAL SHOCX, PIECE PART FAILURE
ET_ECTSI_T_O_ :, ...... , _=____=_._:_. .. ........ .....
THE FAILED ASSEMBLY CAUSESTHE PREMATURE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS
FAIL LIGHT. THE LIGHT SERVES AS A FALSE INDICATION TO THE CREW
THAT THE NWS SYSTEM IS NOT RELIABLE. THE CREW WOULD RESPOND BY
T_LING THE NWS swIT_HFF _ _TASLY _WN_DDES NWSTO
i
ms
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nm
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THE FREE CASTOR MODE. SWITCHING TO TEE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WOULD
NOT EXTINGUISH THE FAIL LIGHT.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EF_CTI_ SPEEDS.
DIPFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES :
j
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 403
HIGHEST CRITICA/_TY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/LOSS OF OUTPUT SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY
ANNENCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITiCALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
0NORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SA2T.NG: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]
LOCATION: 30V73AIS; FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: MC434-0283-0002
c ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : :
THE LOSS OF TEE CONTROL ASSEMBLY OUTPUT SIGNAL INHIBITS THE
ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. AS A RESULT, EARLY FAILURE
DETECTION CAPABILITY IS LOST AND CREW RECOGNITION OF A SECOND NWS
FAILURE WOULD BE AFTER THE FACT- RESULTING IN THE NEED FOR A MORE
TIME CRITICAL CORRECTIVE ACTION.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
RE_CES :
L_
C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID" 404 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, FORWARD LOAD CONTROL (TYPE III HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED/PREMATURE SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY (EPD&C)
TYPE III HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER: FLCA No. 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAF_G: 2/IR
P_EDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] • [p] c[P]
LOCATION: 83V76AIS; AVIONICS BAY NO. 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0056-0001
CAUSES: V_BRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PREMATURE SIGNAL FROM THE DRIVER RESULTS IN THEANNUNCIATION
OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. THE LIGHT SERVES AS A FALSE INDICATION TO
TEE CREW THAT THE NWS SYSTEM MAY NOT BE RELIABLE. TEE CREW WOULD
D
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RESPOND BY TOGGLING THE NWS SW'_TCH TO OFF WHICH MANUALLY
DOWNMODES NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE. SWITCHING TO THE DIRECT
MODE 0FI_74S WOULD NOT EXTINGUISH THE FAIL LIGHT. ....__ _.....
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3004 (CRIT 2/IR)
!
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DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 405 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, FORWARD LOAD CONTROL (TYPE III HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/LOSS OF OUTPUT SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIXRARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
s)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY (EPD&C)
TYPE III HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER: FLCA No. 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE EDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SA_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 83V76AIS; AVIONICS BAY No. 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0056-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE DRIVER OUTPUT SIGNAL INHIBITS THE ANNUNCIATION OF
CAPABI_ _S _ST __LEW_COGNITION OF A SECOND NWS FAILURE
WOULD BE AFTER THE FACT- RESULTING IN THE NEED FOR A MORE TIME
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS I_S ST_LL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3003 (CRIT 3/3)
C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 023)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
8)
s)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
CIRCUIT BREAEY./_ 023
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4-CB023; PANEL 014
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN CONTACT
EF_C_S/_ION_: .........__ _ ......_ __ _ ......
C_B23 PROVIDES NWS CIR_T' PROTEC_ _O_f _ _ A _ IS
ONLY SOURCE OF POWER FOR NWS. FAILING CB23 OPEN WILL REMOVE
ELECTRICAL POWER TO NWS RESULTING IN AN AUTOMATIC DOWNMODE TO
FREZ CASTOR AND THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER THE VEHICLE WHEN THX RUDDER BECOMES
INEFrECTrV_. .................
THE NWS SYSTEM WILL ALWAYs HAVE A SINGLE POINT FAILURE AS LONG AS
THE SYSTEM HAS ONLY ONE POWER SOURCE. :......
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3001 (CRIT 2/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE" 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIZRARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
CIRCUIT BREAKER 023
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4-CB023; PANEL 014
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SHORTED CONTACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CB23 PROVIDES NWS CIRCUIT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS A WHICH IS THE
ONLY SOm_CZ 9_ _FOR _S. _N_ CB2_3 CLOS_D_ _ NO EFFECT
EXCE_ _ IL___SSOF IPROTECTIQN_A_I_;_ H_GH __/VOLTAGE
SPIKES. CLOSED IS _ _0_ 09ERAT_NG MODE-Y0_ CB2_ DURING NWS.
POWER TO THE NWS SYSTEM CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE NWS TOGGLE
SWITCH. NWS CAN STILL BE DISENGAGED BY THE ERROR DETECTION
C_ITS_ _"_-_S_ _L __T_ S_ _0_ _ _ __W_T_. ......
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VE_TTCLE IS AVAILABLE AT E_FECTIVE SPEEDS. DIffERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MuDE _0P_E_ING_T_T IS_sT_LL AVk_LA_LZ,- .................
RE_ERENCES: EPD&C 3002 (CRIT 3/3)
I
C-59
m
_EP_T O_IT_ _SESSM_ mR
DA_: 11/20/86
S_SYS_M: _S
M_C ID: 503
_G_ST _TI_I_
F_G_:
_ORT:
HDW/_C
1/1
1/1
I_:
F__ MODE:
_I_TOR, _SH _ON: RO_/YAW (CSS/A_O)
J_S TO A_I_ CO_A_ (CSS/A_O)
_YST: _ MED_VI_ S_YS _: A HO_IN
__ ___:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
s)
"i)
s)
9)
_S
A_IVATION SYSTEM
_SH B_TON INDICTOR: ROT T/YAW (CSS/A_O)
_TI_TZES
_G_ _E _W/_C _RT HDW/_C
__: /NA RT_: i/1
T.7_OFF: /NA T_: I/1
ONO_IT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEO_IT= /NA ATO: /NA
__G/S_G: 1/1
_D_D_ S_S: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P]
_TION: _ 30 (F_G_ DE_; p_T._ F2,F4
P_T _B_: ME452-0061-7141, -7142 •
_USES: CO__ATION, VIB_TION, __Z_ SHO_,
F_L_ (S_NG)
E_S/_T_ON_:
RO_/YAW (CSS/A_) PBZs CONFI_ _ _G_ COBOL (D_)
EI_ __ OR A_ _D_ (A_O_) CO_O_ J_M_G
PIECE PART
S_T_ _ _S _ NO EY_. J_MING _ S_T_ TO A_O _S_TS
L_
g
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IN _ _SS OF _ __ DI_ION_ COBOL _D _SSIBT._ _SS
OF _CT_. _ O_IT_ _ES SOT_LY ON _ _D_ FOR
DI_ION_ COBOL BE_ MGTD _ NGTD _D A__ _QUI_S A
R_AY _ M__R E__ ST_ING CO_ GE_TION.
M_AL OVERRIDE "F THE JAMMED AUTO IS POSSIBLE IF THE CSS PBI IS
_ DE_SS_; H__ _iS IS _ OFF-NOMIN_ _OCED_.
NGTD, _ D_ MODE OF _S IS AV_BT_ B_ _ R_DER,
_ WO_ STIT._. BE CO_O_D BY A_O_D GUID_CE, _Y OPPOSE
__G EFFE_ OF _ _. DIFFE_}_T_ B_NG IS A MODE OF
S_ERING _T IS STIT.T. AVAI_T._.
__NCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/20/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, PUSH BUTTON: ROLL/YAW (CSS/AUTO)
FAILS TO RESPOND
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) NWS
2)_ ACTIVATION SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR: ROLL/YAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
(CSS/AUTO)
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AREA 30 (FLIGHT DECK); PANELS F2,F4 .
PART NUMBER: ME452-0061-7141,-7142
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_ THE ROLL/YAW (CSS/AUTO) PBIs CONFIGURE THE FLIGHT C0_OL (DAP)
TO EITHER MANUAL OR AUTO GUIDANCE (AUTOLAND) CONTROL. FIRST
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT, RM WILL DOWNMODE TO LAST OUTPUT.
AUTO/CSS CAN BE SELECTED FROM THEOTHER_WM_BER's STATION. CSS
CONFIGURATION CAN BE SELECTED BY DEFLECTING THE RHC.
LOSS OF ALL REUNDANCY CAUSES THE LOSS OF ALL MANUAL DIRECTIONAL
CONTROL AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. THE ORBITER RELIES SOLELY
ON THE RUDDER FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL BETWEEN MGTD AND NGTD AND
AUTOLAND REQUIRES A RUNWAY WITH MSBLS FOR EFFECTIVE STEERING
COMMAND GENERATION.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTORS, ISOLATION (3)
FAILURE MODE: HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
ISOLATION RESISTORS (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE KDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED Da3 s ENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /NA
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 31V73A2AI-A6RI, -A6R2, -A6R3 ; PANEL L2AI
PART NUMBER: RLR070512GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EF_CTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLKTIONI_ESZSTdRS PROVI'DENWS STATUS MONITORING CZ_IT
PROTECTION FROM THE MAIN POWER BUSES.
FAILING THE RESISTORS HIGH HAS NO EFFECT ON NWS. NWS MODE
INTERPRETATION LOGIC iS USED TO DETERMINE THE ACTIVE MODE OF NWS.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT iS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3007 (CRIT 3/3)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTORS, ISOLATION (3)
LOW RESISTANC_
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
ISOLATION RESISTORS (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE WnW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 3IV73A2AI-A6RI, -A6R2, -A6R3 ; PANEL L2AI
PART NUMBER: RLR070512GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCX, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLATION RESISTORS PROVIDE NWS STATUS MONITORING CIRCUIT
PROTECTION FROM THE MAIN POWER BUSES,
FAILING THE _SISTO_W _ '%0 E_CT EXCEPT _ LOSS OF
PROTECTION FROM CURRENT/VOLTAGE SPIKES.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
V_HICLE IS _VAIUmLE AT EF_I_ SPE_DS, DI_'F_L_L _RAr_G _:S
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3007 (CRIT 3/3)
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMIT
FAILURE MODE: HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LI_OFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/ 3
/NA TAL: 3/3
/NA AOA: 3/3
/NA ATO: /NA
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
31V73A2AI-ASR2; PANEL L2AI
RLR320201GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THXRMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO ONE
PATH OF THE NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATION CIRCUITRY FROM POWER BUS
ABI. HIGR RESISTA2/_CE WOULD CUTOFF AB! POWER AND INHIBIT THE
HARD_D PATH FOR NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATION.
THE FAILURE DETECTION LOGIC STILL OPERATES AND W_LL DOWNMODE THE
SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER DETECTABLE FAILURE ......
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRA/C_NG IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3008 (CRIT 3/3)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMIT
LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
S)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIYTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SA21NG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
31V73A2AI-ASR2; PANEL L2AI
RLR320201GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EYFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMIT RESISTOR PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO ONE
PATH OF THE NWS FAI_ ANNUNCIATION CIRCUITRY FROM POWER BUS
ABI. A _"Lm_--oP __w _S_TA_TCZ _ _ NO E_CT ON _WS EXCEPT T_
CIRCUIT PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH CURRECT/VOLTAGE SPIKES IS LOST.
DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHi_ 'i-S_AVAi_ _AT--_YFE-_i$'E-S_-E_-DS._ _DIFF_/%ENT_' B_ING IS
A MODE OF STEERING_TSAT IS STILL AV_LABLE.
REFERENCES: EPDaC 3008 (CRIT 3/3)
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-INDEPENDENT ORBI_ ASSESSMENT
i
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 509 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ANY ACTIVE CONTACT (GPC OR DIRECT)
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BRY2tKDOWN HIERARCHY:
2_
3_
4_
5)
6)
s_
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
NWS 3 POSITION TOGGLE SWITCH: OFP/GPC/DIRECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
_CH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_I_c_ANc_ s_ENs: A CN_ _ s CN_ ] c CNA J
ABORT HDWIFUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /NA
LOCATION: 31V73A21AI-SS; PANEL L2AI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7373
CAUSES:
SHOCK
PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
THE NWS TOGGLE SWITCH SELECTS THE MODE OF NWS TO BE ACTIVATED. IF
THE SWITCH FAILS TO GPC, THERE IS NO EFFECT EXCEPT THE CAPABILITY
TO DESELECT NWS USING TEE SWITCH WOULD BE LOST.
THE SWITCH FAILING TO DIRECT WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE GPC
WRAPAROUND PROTECTION, COMMAND LIMITING/FADING, AND LATERAL
ACCELERATION FEEDBACK; BUT TEE MAXIMUM COMMANDED NW DEFLECTION
WOULD INCREASE FROM 5 TO 9 DEG.
_? _ ACTI_ CONTACTS FAIL ON, NWS IS DEFAULTED TO GPC MODE.
I_UDDER PEDAL CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE
SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3006 (CRIT 3/3)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGEEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/LR
ITEM: SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: AS MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
NWS 3 POSITION TOGGLE SWITCH: OFF/GPC/DIRECT
1)
2)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICAI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 31V73A21AI-S6; PANEL L2AI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7373
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
__S _C, GLE_ oSWIT=_ SELE_S THE =MOD E 0_ NWS TO B_ACTIVATED. IF
T_E S__P_ 0F_, POWER WILL NOT REACH THE SYSTEM AND NWS
WILL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE TO _ CASTOR MODE AND THE NWS FAIL
LIGHT WILL ANNUNCIATE.
Dr_ZCT MODE OF _WS WILL _O FAIZ. _UDDER CONTROL OF
_sT BE USED TO STEER _ VEHICLE_ _'_ _DER SECOMES
INEFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES: EPD&C 3005 (CRIT 2/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI
LOSS OF OUTPUT/POWER LOSS
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCKSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
=)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
S)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTI PLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FFI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIYTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDINGI SA21NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/nn C
2/1R
2/LR
2/1R
/NA
A[ i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 81V72A3; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 1
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FFI PROCESSES TEE NW ENABLE 1 COMMAND AND ONE CHANNEL OF BOTH
T_E RPTA AND THE SPA. LOSS OF THE NW ENABLE 1 BIT WILL
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE THE NWS SYSTEM TO _ FREE CASTOR MODE AND
CAUSE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT TO ANNUNCIATE.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WILL ALSO FAIL. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
MUST BE USED TO STEER TH_ VEHICLE WHEN TH_ RUDDER BECOMES
INEFFECTIVE. ....
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 _CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: NWS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 602 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MDM FFI
FAILURE MODE: STUCK ON LAST OUTPUT/STUCK ON BUSY
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
s)
s)
 r SlDPS
MULT IPLEXER/DE MULTI PLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FFI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LI?TOF : /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAF_NG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/iR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: /NA
A[ i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 81V72A3; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 1
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FFI PROCKSSES THE NW ENABLE 1 COMMAND AND ONE CHANNEL OF BOTH
THE RPTA AND THE SPA. IF-T__ FJ_-LURE OCCURRED BEYORE NGTD, THE
LOSS OF THZ _ ENABLE 1 COMMAND WOULD INHIBIT NWS (GPC AND
DIRECT) ACTIVATION.
IF THE FAILURE OCCURRED AFTER NGTD, THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT; THE
FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY IS STILL OPERABLE AND CAPABLE OF
DOWNMODING THE SYSTEM.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIYFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERI-G THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT w
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: MDM FFI
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OUTPUT/SELECT ALL CHANNELS WRONG
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIYTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFTAgG: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] siP] c[p]
LOCATION: 81V72A3; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 1
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FFI PROCESSES THE NW ENABLE 1 COMMAND AND ONE CHANNEL OF BOTH
THE RPTA AND TEE SPA. PREMATURE-OUTPUT OF NW ENABLE 1 WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT SINCE NW_ENABLE_2 COMMAND IS ALSO T_EEDED TO ACTIVATE
SELECTING ALL CHANNELS WRONG AFTER NGTD WOULD AUTOMATICALLY
DOWNMODE NWS (GPC AND DIRECT) TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND
ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
RUDD_CONTROL OF-THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STITL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/LR
3/LR
ITEM: MDM YY2
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT/POWER LOSS
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCRSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HI_%ARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULT IPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE EDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: INA RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
0NORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : _[m] _[P] coP]
LOCATION: 81V72A4; FWDAV_0N_CS BAY No. 2
PART NUMBER: MC61S-0004-SI00
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF2 PROCESSES THE GPC STEERING COMMAND, THE NWS COMPUTER ON
SIGN_;__ENAB_2 SIGNAL, 0_ _L 0FBOTH-THZRPTA-AND
TH_ SPA, _ T_E LAND_NG GEAR PROXIMITY SENSOR DATA. LOSS OF TEE
NW ENABLE 2 BIT W_LL AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE THE NWS SYSTEM TO THE
FREE CASTOR MODE AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
RE_CES: DPSI00-DPSi08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FI_2
STUCK ON LAST OUTPUT/STUCK ON BUSY
LEAD ANALYST: A EOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTI PLEX_R (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF2)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
_TICALITIES
KDW/FUNC ABORT
/NA RTLS:
/NA TAL:
/NA AOA:
/NA ATO:
3/IR
A[ I] B[P]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V72A4; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 2
MC61S-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EF_CTS/-RATI_NALE: i _ ......
MDM FF2 PROCESSES TEE GPC STEERING COMMAND, THE NWS COMPUTER ON
SIGNAL, T_E NW ENABLE 2 SIGNAL, ONE CHANNEL OF BOTH--THE RPTA--AND
THE SPA, AND THE LANDING GEAR PROXIMITY SENSOR DATA. IF THE
FAILURE OCCURRED BEFORE NGTD, THE LOSS OF THE NW ENABLE 2 BIT
WOULD INHIBIT TEE ACTIVATION OF NWS IN THE GPC MODE. IF-TKE
FAILURE OCCURRED AFTER NGTD, THE GPC STEERING COMMAND INPUT WOULD
CAUSE A MISCOMPARE IN TH_ NW POSITION SOP WHICH WOULD_
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODE NWS TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND ANNUNCIATE
THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
DIRECT MODE O?_S _IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EI_FECTIVE S_EEDS. DIFFERENTI_BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/LR
3/LR
ITEM: MDM FF2
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OUTPUT/SELECT ALL CHANNELS WRONG
  YST: A SUBSYS A  OC.STE 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
11
2)
3)
4)
s_
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE EDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDINGISAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 81V72A4; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: V_BRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF2 PROCESSES THE GPC STEERING COMMAND, THE NWS COMPUTER ON
SIGNAL, THE NW ENABLE 2 SIGNAL, ONE CHANNEL OF BOTH-THE RPTA-AND
THESPA, AND TEE LANDING GEAR PROXIMITY SENSOR DATA. PREMATURE
OUTPUT WULD NAVE NO EFFECT.
SELECTING ALL CHANNELS WRONG AFTER NGTD WOULD AUTOMATICALLY
DO.ODE NWS TO _ FREE CASTOR MODE AND ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL
LIGHT.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS ST_LL AVAILABLE.
ItEFERENCES: DPS100-DPS108 (CRIT 3/IR)
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/LR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM FF3
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT/POWER LOSS
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
=)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF3)
CRITICALITIZS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 81V72AS; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 3A
PART NUMBER: MC6!S_0004_Si_0= _i_ ,: _i
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
MDM YY3 PROCESSES THE NW MAN ON SIGNAL, ONE CHANNEL OF THE RPTA,
AND THE LANDING GEAR PROX'IMITY DATA. THE ONLY EFFECT OF THE
i
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_-_S-...... TH_qD_'S_DT-_ %_AT_DF REDUNDANC_/_ _i_ TO
HOWEVER, IF THE FF3 FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE IN THE DIRECT MODE OF
NWS, THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT. RM MAINTAINS THE ENABLES WITH
.w acTIVe_STATUS ON. _ _ ..... _...........
REDDER CONTROL _ THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE sPEEDs.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEER/NG THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 608
HIGHEST CRITICA_TY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/LR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FF3
STUCK ON LAST OUTPUT/STUCK ON BUSY MODE
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD" A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HII_%RCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
NWS/DPS
MULTI PLEXER/DEMULTI PLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF3)
CRITICALITI_S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFXNG: 3/IR
P_EDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 81V72AS; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 3A
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EYFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF3 PROCESSES THE NW_MAN_0N SIGNAL, ONE CHANNEL OF THE RPTA,
AND THE LANDING GEAR PROXIMITY DATA. THE ONLY EFFECT OF THE
FAILURE IS THE LOSS 0Y ONE PATH OF REDUNDANCY, THE CAPABILITY TO
DESELECT GPC AND THEN SELECT DIRECT MODE OF NWS WOULD BE LOST;
HOWEVER, IF THE FF3 FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE IN THE DIRECT MODE OF
NWS TEERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
RE_ERY/qCES: DPSI00-DPS108 (CRIT 3/IR)
R
C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT I
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 6O9
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM FF3
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OUTPUT/SELECT ALL CHANNELS WRONG
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
9)
m_s/DPs
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FY3)
CRITICAI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIYTOFY: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SA2ING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] sip] c[P]
LOCATION: 81V72A5; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 3A
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF3 PROCESSES TKE NW MAN ON SIGNAL, ONE CHANNEL OF THE RPTA,
AND THE LANDING GEAR PROX'IMIT-Y DATA. TEE ONLY EFFECT OF THE
FAILURE IS THE LOSS OF ONE PATH OF REDUNDANCY. PREMATURE OUTPUT
WOULD HAVE NO EI_FECT; RM SOLVES DILEMMA OF TWO "ON" SIGNALS.
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IY THE DIRECT MODE WERE ACTIVE AND ALLCHANNELS WERE SELECTED
WRONG, THE RM STILL MAINTAINS THE ENABLE SIGNALS ..............
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DI__-IAL BRAKINGISAMODE OF STEEP/'NG THAT IS STI_LL .......
AVAILABLE.
RE_CES: DPSI00"DPSi08 (CRIT 3/IR) mm
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DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: MDM FF4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT/POWER LOSS
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIVRARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
NWSIDPS
MULTIPLEXERI DE MULTI PLEX_R (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF4)
C  ICU  =ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C A_ORT _W/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: INA RTLS: 311R
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
0NORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V72A6_ FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 2
MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: V_BRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF4 PROCESSES TEE NW ACTIVE STATUS SIGNAL, THE NW P0S ERROR
SIGNAL AND ONE CHANNEL 0FTHE SPA. THE ACTIVE STATUS IS ON-LY USED
BY RM. THZ FAII/TRE DETECTION CIRCUITS ARE STILL ACTIVE AND COULD
STILL DOWNMODE THE NWS SYSTEM TO TEE FREE CASTOR MODE AND
ANNUNCIATE TEE NWS FAIL LIGHT VIA THE HARDWIRED PATH IF ANOTKER
DETECTABLE FAILURE OCCURRED.
TEE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
m
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: MDM FF4
FAILURE MODE: STUCX ON LAST OUTPUT/STUCK ON BUSY MODE
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
S)
7)
S)
NWS/DPS
MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTI PLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF4)
CRITICALITIZS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIYTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAYING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 81V72A6; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM FF4 PROCESSES THE NW ACTIVE STATUS SIGNAL, THE NW POS ERROR
SIGNAL AND ONE CHANNEL OF THE SPA_ THE ACTIVE STATUS I-S ONLY USED
BY RM. THE FAI_ DETECTION CIRCUITS ARE STILL ACTIVE AND COULD
STILL DOWNMODE THE NWS SYSTEM TO THE FREE CASTOR MODE AND
ANNUNCIATE THE NWS FAIL LIGHT VIA THE HARDWZRED PATH IF ANOTHER
DETECTABLE FAILURE OCCURRED.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS
A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPSI08 (CRIT 3/IR)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 612
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: MDM FF4
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OUTPUT/SELECT ALL CHANNELS WRONG
LEAD ANALYST: A HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
S)
m_S/DPS
MULTI PLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM)
FLIGHT CRITICAL FORWARD MDM (FF4)
CRITICKLITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 81V72A6; FWD AVIONICS BAY No. 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EYFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM YY4 PROCESSES THE NWACTIVE STATUS SIGNAL, THE NW POS ERROR
SIGNAL AND ONE CHANNEL OF THE S_A. THE ACTIV_ STATUS I--SOFrL¥ USED
BY RM. A PREMATURE NW POS ERROR SET TO TRUE WOULD CAUSE THE NWS
FAIL LIGHT TO ANNUNCIATE. THE CREW WOULD MANUALLY DOWNMODE NWS TO
TEE FREE CASTOR MODE BY TOGGLING THE NWS SWITCH TO OFF.
SWITCHING TO THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS WOULD NOT EXTINGUISH THE NWS
FAIL LIGHT.
RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAXING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: DPSI00-DPS108 (CRIT 3/IR)
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MDAC ID
i01
102
103
104
107
108
201
202
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206
301
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
emlemw
PEDALS, RUDDER
PEDALS, RUDDER
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
RPTA
RPTA
BOX, NWS CNTL-FAILURE DETECT
BOX, NWS CNTL-PILOT VALVE CNTL
BOX, NWS CNTL-STEERING SIGNAL
BOX, NWS CNTL-STEERING SIGNAL
ACCUMULATOR
ACCUMULATOR
NWS ACTUATOR HYD HOUSING
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM
FILTER, INLET
FILTER, INLET
HOSE ASSEMBLY (ACTUATOR)
HOSE ASSEMBLY (ACTUATOR)
SWITCH, PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK
TRANSDUCER; FEEDBACK
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION (2)
VALVE, E-H SERVO CONTROL
VALVE, E-H SERVO CONTROL
VALVE, E-H PROTECT/ISOLATION
VALVE, E-H PROTECT/ISOLATION
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK (2)
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK (2)
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID No. 1
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID No.2
VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS
VALVE, SHUTOFF
ASSEMBLY, ANNUNCIATOR CNTL
DRIVER, HYBRID TYPE III
_, CIRCUIT 023
PBI, ROLL/YAW CSS/AUTO
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE
MDM FFI
MDM FYl
MDM FFI
MDM FF4
FAILURE MODE
im em em am mm _41m mmllllmm_
JAMMED
LOSS OF LINKAGE
NO OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILS ON (DETECTS)
OPEN (LOSS OF SIGNAL)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
OPEN
CLOSED
RUPTURE
JAMMED
BROKEN LINKAGE
OPEN
CLOSED
RUPTURE
BLOCKED
OPEN
NO OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
OPEN/LEAKAGE
FAILS TO RESPOND
ERRATIC OPERATION
OPEN
CLOSED
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED (BYPASSES)
CLOSED
PREMATURE SIGNAL
PREMATURE SIGNAL
OPEN
JAMMED (TO AUTO)
OFF
LOSS OF OUTPUT
STUCX-LAST OUTPUT
ALL CHNLS WRONG
ALL CHNLS WRONG
D-I
vIR
in
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m
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